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Recently, however, a broad coalition of public figures, scholars, advocates, 
courts, and philanthropic foundations have begun to push for the establishment 
of a public defender system for poor immigrants facing deportation. Yet the 
national debate about appointing defense counsel for immigrants has proceeded 
with limited information regarding how many immigrants currently obtain 
attorneys and the efficacy and efficiency of such representation. 
This Article presents the results of the first national study of access to 
counsel in United States immigration courts. Drawing on data from over 1.2 
million deportation cases decided between 2007 and 2012, we find that only 
37% of all immigrants, and a mere 14% of detained immigrants, secured 
representation. Only 2% of immigrants obtained pro bono representation from 
nonprofit organizations, law school clinics, or large law firm volunteer 
programs. Barriers to representation were particularly severe in immigration 
courts located in rural areas and small cities, where almost one-third of 
detained cases were adjudicated. Moreover, we find that immigrants with 
attorneys fared far better: among similarly situated removal respondents, the 
odds were fifteen times greater that immigrants with representation, as 
compared to those without, sought relief, and five-and-a-half times greater that 
they obtained relief from removal. In addition, we show that involvement of 
counsel was associated with certain gains in court efficiency: represented 
respondents brought fewer unmeritorious claims, were more likely to be released 
from custody, and, once released, were more likely to appear at their future 
deportation hearings. This research provides an essential data-driven 
understanding of immigration representation that should inform discussions of 
expanding access to counsel.  
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INTRODUCTION 
It has long been the case that immigrants have a right to counsel in 
immigration court, but not at the expense of the government.1 In recent 
years, advocates, bar organizations, scholars, public figures, and foundations 
have begun to push for the establishment of a national public defender 
system to appoint counsel for at least some poor immigrants facing 
deportation.2 Following a landmark decision in the Ninth Circuit,3 
immigration judges now appoint counsel for detainees with serious mental 
impairments.4 A nationwide class action lawsuit alleges that the federal 
 
1 Although there is a right to be represented by counsel in immigration proceedings, the 
expense of counsel is borne by the respondent. See Immigration and Nationality Act 
§ 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) [hereinafter I.N.A.] (“[T]he alien shall have the 
privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing 
who is authorized to practice in such proceedings.”); Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 
549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A]liens have a due process right to obtain counsel of their choice at 
their own expense.” (citation omitted)). 
2 For a discussion of the key debates in establishing a Gideon-type right to public defense for 
immigration courts, see generally Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282 (2013).  
3 Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
4 In response to the Franco-Gonzalez decision, the government unveiled a new nationwide 
policy to appoint counsel for immigrants with serious mental disabilities. Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security Announce 
Safeguards for Unrepresented Immigration Detainees with Serious Mental Disorders or 
Conditions (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/04/21/safeguards-
unrepresented-immigration-detainees.pdf [http://perma.cc/HR36-3HET].  
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government is legally required to appoint counsel for all children in removal 
proceedings.5 Prominent judges,6 politicians,7 and bar association leaders8 
have called for systematic attention to providing representation for 
immigrants facing deportation. Government and philanthropic donors 
established the first-ever program to provide appointed counsel for detained 
immigrants in New York City,9 and an innovative pro bono effort provided 
universal volunteer representation for women and children held in a remote 
detention facility in Artesia, New Mexico.10 
 
5 Complaint—Class Action at 23-24, J.E.F.M. v. Holder, No. 2:14-cv-01026 (W.D. Wash. July 
9, 2014). In September 2014, the Department of Justice, together with the Corporation for 
National and Community Service, announced $1.8 million in funding to provide approximately 100 
lawyers and paralegals to represent children in immigration proceedings. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Justice Department and CNCS Announce $1.8 Million in Grants to Enhance 
Immigration Court Proceedings and Provide Legal Assistance to Unaccompanied Children (Sept. 
12, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-cncs-announce-18-million-grants-
enhance-immigration-court-proceedings [http://perma.cc/FDY6-3WD2]. 
6 Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the Second Circuit has led the movement from the 
bench, convening a “Study Group on Immigrant Representation” in New York and spearheading 
various other initiatives. See Robert A. Katzmann, When Legal Representation is Deficient: The 
Challenge of Immigration Cases for the Courts, 143 DAEDALUS 37 (2014). 
7 For example, in 2014, the Attorney General of Washington called for “the federal government 
to ensure every child who faces deportation has an attorney by his or her side in order to receive a fair 
hearing.” Press Release, Wash. State Office of the Att. Gen., Attorney General Takes Action to 
Support Legal Representation for Children in Deportation Hearings (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.atg. 
wa.gov/news/news-releases/attorney-general-takes-action-support-legal-representation-children-de 
portation [http://perma.cc/V85E-3WCU]. A bill passed by the United States Senate in 2013 to 
reform the immigration system, the “Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration 
Modernization Act,” also included a provision that required counsel to be appointed for 
unaccompanied children, mentally disabled, and other vulnerable groups of detainees. S. 744, 113th. 
Cong. § 3502(c) (2013), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113s744is/pdf/BILLS-113s744is.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/QYA8-G7LS]. 
8 The American Bar Association recently passed a resolution advocating that “[c]ounsel should be 
appointed for unaccompanied children at government expense at all stages of the immigration process 
. . . .” ABA, HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 113 (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.americanbar. 
org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2015mm_hodres/113.pdf [http://perma.cc/9HWF-6FM3]. 
9 This city-funded program, known as the “New York Immigrant Family Unity Project,” is 
the first program in the nation to provide universal court-appointed deportation defense counsel 
in detained cases. See Our Work: New York Immigrant Family Unity Project, BRONX DEFENDERS, 
http://www.bronxdefenders.org/programs/new-york-immigrant-family-unity-project [http://perma. 
cc/3PGU-GHQY] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (describing the pilot program in New York City to 
provide institutional public defenders in immigration detention).  
10 For a dynamic discussion of the pro bono model used in Artesia, New Mexico, see Stephen 
Manning, Ending Artesia, INNOVATION L. LAB (Jan. 2015), https://innovationlawlab.org/the-
artesia-report [https://perma.cc/SVT9-JJN7] [hereinafter Ending Artesia]. In November 2014, the 
government abruptly announced it would close the Artesia Detention Facility and transfer the 
women and children held there to detention facilities in Texas. Wil S. Hylton, The Shame of 
America’s Family Detention Camps, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2015 (Magazine), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-americas-family-detention-camps.html [http://perma.cc/ 
BFG5-XTZA]. A similar pro bono model now operates to assist women and children held at Texas 
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Advocates favoring government funding of immigration counsel rely on 
claims that too many immigrants are forced to go before immigration judges 
without counsel and that unrepresented litigants fare worse than do those 
with attorneys.11 Other arguments in support of providing counsel reflect 
the belief that attorneys can reduce the strain on overworked judges by 
helping to resolve cases more quickly.12 Yet, on a national level, there is 
limited factual information available to support these assumptions. 
Although the federal government publishes a yearly statistical review, such 
reports focus on the immigration court’s caseload rather than on a detailed 
analysis of attorney representation.13 Prior efforts to study representation in 
immigration court, while extremely valuable, rely on data samples of limited 
size and scope, such as cases decided in one city,14 cases raising certain types 
 
detention facilities in Dilley and Karnes City. See CARA Family Detention Pro Bono Project, AM. 
IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N (June 29, 2015), http://www.aila.org/practice/pro-bono/find-your-
opportunity/cara-family-detention-pro-bono-project [http://perma.cc/D2VE-NP58] [hereinafter 
CARA Pro Bono Project] (describing the purpose and operation of a program that provides pro 
bono legal services directly to detained women and children). 
11 See, e.g., STUDY GROUP ON IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION, ACCESSING JUSTICE II: A 
MODEL FOR PROVIDING COUNSEL TO NEW YORK IMMIGRANTS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 1 
(Dec. 2012), http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/NYIRS_ReportII.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
7JTN-P49R] [hereinafter N.Y. STUDY REPORT] (describing an “acute shortage of qualified attorneys 
willing and able to represent indigent immigrants facing deportation” and noting that “the impact of 
having counsel [on case outcomes] cannot be overstated”); Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for 
Appointed Counsel, INSIGHT, Apr. 2005, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/insight/Insight_Kerwin.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Q85Q-F8TB] (arguing that an appointed counsel system for immigrants is necessary 
given that the lack of counsel has a pronounced, negative impact on case outcomes). 
12 See, e.g., Lucas Guttentag & Ahilan Arulanantham, Extending the Promise of Gideon: 
Immigration, Deportation, and the Right to Counsel, 39 HUM. RTS. 14, 16 (2013) (“Advocates have also 
shown that speedy appointment of counsel can save substantial detention costs if detained 
immigrants have qualified lawyers to promptly assess their claims.”); M. Margaret McKeown & 
Allegra McLeod, The Counsel Conundrum: Effective Representation in Immigration Proceedings, (“At 
every stage of immigration proceedings, as in other areas of litigation and adjudication, the 
presence of competent counsel improves the efficiency of case processing and the administration 
of justice.”) in REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 286, 289 (Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al. eds., 2009).  
13 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012 
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK (2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/03/04/ 
fy12syb.pdf [http://perma.cc/TF2P-HENZ] [hereinafter 2012 YEARBOOK] (providing statistics on 
immigration courts’ caseloads in fiscal year 2012). 
14 See, e.g., N. CAL. COLLABORATIVE FOR IMMIGRANT JUSTICE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR 
IMMIGRANT FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES: STUDY OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF DETAINED 
IMMIGRANTS IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA 15-16 (Oct. 2014), https://media.law.stanford.edu/ 
organizations/clinics/immigrant-rights-clinic/11-4-14-Access-to-Justice-Report-FINAL.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/L8GJ-8ZAT] [hereinafter REPRESENTATION IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA] (analyzing 
8992 cases decided by the San Francisco immigration court between March 1, 2013 and February 28, 
2014); Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study Report, Accessing Justice: The 
Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, New York Immigrant Representation Study 
 
  
6 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 1 
 
of claims,15 or cases from select immigration courts.16 As courts and 
policymakers explore models for creating a public defender corps for 
immigration courts, it is crucial to bring data to bear in order to understand 
the role attorneys currently play on a national scale.17  
This Article presents the results of the first national study of the scope 
and impact of attorney representation in United States immigration courts. 
Our study is based on an independent analysis of over 1.2 million 
immigration removal cases decided during the six-year period between 2007 
and 2012.18 This extensive dataset was obtained from the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review (EOIR), the division of the Department of Justice 
that conducts immigration court proceedings.19 Our analysis of these court 
cases was informed by our study of court rules and procedures and review of 
government documents obtained through the Freedom of Information 
Act.20 In addition, qualitative research provided an on-the-ground 
understanding of the data we analyzed.21 This investigation included 
 
Report: Part 1, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 362 (2011) [hereinafter New York Immigrant 
Representation] (analyzing 71,767 cases with at least one hearing in New York immigration courts 
between October 1, 2005 and July 13, 2010). 
15 See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 295, 296, 394-96 (2007) (studying over 140,000 decisions of immigration judges in 
nondetained, non-Mexican asylum cases decided between January 2000 and August 2004). 
16 See, e.g., NINA SIULC ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAM: 
EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOME MEASUREMENT REPORT, PHASE II, at 78, 81 
(2008), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/LOP_evalution_updated_5-20-
08.pdf [http://perma.cc/94HU-8YYN] [hereinafter VERA EVALUATION] (analyzing 44,054 cases that 
began between January 1, 2006 and August 31, 2006 in detained immigration courts, focusing on those 
cases that received Legal Orientation Program services funded by the Department of Justice).  
17 As economist John Montgomery explained in a recent attempt to quantify the cost of a 
national immigration public defender system, “information and data on legal representation in 
immigration proceedings is incomplete.” DR. JOHN D. MONTGOMERY, NERA ECON. 
CONSULTING, COST OF COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPOSAL 
PROVIDING PUBLIC COUNSEL TO INDIGENT PERSONS SUBJECT TO IMMIGRATION REMOVAL 
PROCEEDINGS 2 (May 28, 2014), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/ 
NERA_Immigration_Report_5.28.2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/K57F-NPE2].  
18 The complete Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) administrative database 
that we obtained included 6,165,128 individual immigration proceedings that span fiscal years 1951 
to 2013. Following the procedures discussed in more detail in Part B of the Appendix, these data 
were reduced to an analytical sample of 1,206,633 individual deportation cases in which 
immigration judges reached a decision on the merits between fiscal years 2007 and 2012. 
19 As explained in the Appendix, this administrative database was obtained from EOIR—
using the Freedom of Information Act—by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
(TRAC), a data-gathering and research nonprofit organization at Syracuse University. We gained 
access to these data through our academic appointments as TRAC Fellows. List of TRAC Fellows, 
TRAC FELLOWS (2015), http://trac.syr.edu/fellows.html [http://perma.cc/JH7J-69DB].  
20 See infra Appendix. 
21 Mixing quantitative and qualitative approaches can produce a better understanding of 
many research problems. See JOHN W. CRESWELL & VICKI L. PLANO CLARK, DESIGNING 
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attending court sessions at six of the highest-volume immigration courts,22 
observations of the know-your-rights programs provided to detained 
respondents in these courts,23 and interviews with representatives of the 
National Association of Immigration Judges24 and attorneys representing 
immigrants in removal proceedings around the country.25 
Our study provides empirically based answers to the key questions 
regarding immigration representation that judges, advocates, and 
policymakers are asking. While many of these answers confirm the 
intuitions of those most familiar with immigration courts, others counter 
the conventional wisdom regarding the availability of counsel. Part I begins 
by providing a principled statistical analysis of what it means to be 
“represented” by counsel in immigration court. By looking at individual 
removal cases decided on the merits, we find that only 37% of immigrants 
had counsel during our study period from 2007 to 2012.26 Importantly, this 
percentage is lower than what is reported in government publications that 
do not rely on the proportion of cases with representation, but rather rely 
on the proportion of court proceedings with representation. Our research 
reveals that represented cases are more likely to have multiple proceedings 
in a single case and, therefore, a proceeding-based measurement technique 
artificially inflates representation rates.27  
Our research also counters the standard narrative that the supply of 
counsel is increasing as a result of expanded pro bono legal services. We 
 
AND CONDUCTING MIXED METHODS RESEARCH 12-15 (2d ed. 2011) (arguing that mixed 
methods research can alleviate the weaknesses in both qualitative and quantitative research).  
22 These court observations were conducted in the following immigration court jurisdictions: 
Chicago, Ill.; Elizabeth, N.J.; Houston, Tex.; Los Angeles, Cal.; Newark, N.J.; and San Antonio, Tex. 
23 These nonprofit know-your-rights information sessions were attended at the following 
detention locations: Elizabeth Contract Detention Facility in Elizabeth, N.J.; Houston Contract 
Detention Facility in Houston, Tex.; South Texas Detention Facility in Pearsall, Tex.; Kenosha 
County Detention Center in Kenosha, Wis.; and Essex County Jail in Essex, N.J. 
24 See FAQ’s, NAT’L ASS’N OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES, http://naij-usa.org/faqs 
[http://perma.cc/7E7E-XXEW] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (“In 1979, the NAIJ was designated as 
the recognized representative for collective bargaining for all U.S. Immigration Judges.”).  
25 These semi-structured interviews were conducted with the informed consent of 
participants pursuant to a protocol approved by the UCLA Institutional Review Board.  
26 This measurement counts as represented all removal respondents who had counsel at some 
point prior to the judge’s decision on the merits. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
27 See, e.g., LENNI B. BENSON & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ENHANCING QUALITY AND 
TIMELINESS IN IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJUDICATION 56, app. 3 at 125 (June 7, 2012), 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Enhancing-Quality-and-Timeliness-in-Immigration-
Removal-Adjudication-Final-June-72012.pdf [http://perma.cc/2QQL-YYMZ] (using a proceeding-based 
approach to conclude that 51% of immigrants in immigration courts had counsel in fiscal year 2011); 2012 
YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at G1 (using a proceeding-based approach to conclude that 56% of immigrants 
had representation in fiscal year 2012). 
  
8 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 1 
 
show that the gradual increase in representation rate that occurred during 
the study period captures a decline in completed case volume, not an 
increase in the number of immigrants who actually received 
representation.28 Moreover, we find that only 2% of immigrants facing 
removal secured pro bono representation from large law firms, nonprofits, 
or law school clinics. The lion’s share of immigrant representation—90% 
during the six-year study period—was provided by solo or small firm 
practitioners.29 Finally, discussions of attorney representation often assume 
that representation is necessarily complete, but we find that only 45% of 
immigrants we count as “represented” had an attorney appear at all of their 
court hearings.30  
Part II builds on these baseline descriptions of representation in United 
States immigration courts to uncover stark inequality in the distribution of 
limited attorney resources. Representation rates differed markedly along 
key axes, including detention status, geographic location of the court, and 
the nationality of the respondent. Across the six-year period studied, 
detained respondents went without counsel 86% of the time.31 Revealing 
wide geographic disparities in representation, we find that almost 90% of 
nondetained immigrants in New York City secured counsel, compared to 
only .002% of detained respondents in Tucson, Arizona.32 Immigrants with 
court hearings in large cities had representation rates more than four times 
greater than those with hearings in small cities or rural locations.33 
Immigrants from Mexico had the lowest representation rate of any major 
nationality group in our study, with only 21% represented in court.34 
Part III investigates two commonly asked questions in the debate over 
the potential creation of a national system for immigrant representation—the 
first focuses on efficacy and the second on efficiency.35 First, is providing 
 
28 See infra Figure 2 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra Figure 5 and accompanying text.  
30 See infra Figure 3 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra Figure 6 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra Figures 10a & 10b and accompanying text. 
33 See infra Section II.B. 
34 See infra Figure 12 and accompanying text. 
35 For further development of these two guiding concepts of efficacy and efficiency, as well as 
a third important concept of equality, see Eagly, supra note 2, at 2306-13 (exploring these “three 
somewhat competing goals that have influenced the current system of indigent criminal defense”). 
See also AM. BAR ASS’N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO 
PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE 
ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 1-59 to 1-73 (2010), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocuments/aba_complete_full_report.authcheckda
m.pdf [http://perma.cc/R3BF-8XVM] (summarizing key issues in immigration adjudication, 
including fairness, court efficiency, and access to counsel).  
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lawyers for immigrants associated with more immigrants seeking relief from 
removal and obtaining successful outcomes in their cases? Second, 
regardless of case outcome, do lawyers grease the wheels of justice, enabling 
courts to get their work done in less time?  
With respect to the efficacy of representation, we find that immigrants 
who are represented by counsel do fare better at every stage of the court 
process—that is, their cases are more likely to be terminated, they are more 
likely to seek relief, and they are more likely to obtain the relief they seek.36 
For example, detained immigrants with counsel obtained a successful outcome 
(i.e., case termination or relief) in 21% of cases, ten-and-a-half times greater 
than the 2% rate for their pro se counterparts.37 Success rates were even 
higher among immigrants represented by nonprofit organizations, large law 
firms, or law school clinics.38 Moreover, the relationship between 
representation and successful cases was statistically significant and persisted 
when controlling for other variables that could affect case outcomes, including 
detention status, nationality, prosecutorial charge type, fiscal year of decision, 
and jurisdiction of the immigration court. Among similarly situated 
respondents, the odds were fifteen times greater that immigrants with 
representation, as compared to those without, sought relief and five-and-a-
half times greater that they obtained relief from removal.39 
We also document certain court inefficiencies associated with the lack of 
representation in immigration courts. When immigrants are detained, 
lengthy judicial processes are costly not just for the courts, but also for 
detention officials who must pay for the immigrants’ housing costs during 
the pendency of the case. We find that among detained immigrants who 
sought counsel, almost 51% of all court adjudication time was incurred due 
to time requested to find an attorney.40 Yet the majority of these detained 
immigrants never found counsel.41 Additionally, those immigrants who were 
represented by counsel were more likely than their pro se counterparts to 
have custody hearings and be released from detention, which further saves 
detention costs.42 Also, once released, represented immigrants were 
 
36 For a discussion of these terms, see infra Parts I & III. 
37 See infra Figure 14 and accompanying text. Similarly, never-detained immigrants with 
counsel obtained a successful outcome in 60% of cases, three-and-a-half times greater than the 17% 
for their unrepresented counterparts. Id. 
38 See infra Table 3 and accompanying text. 
39 This finding is statistically significant at the p < .001 level, which means that the 
probability of this result occurring by chance is less than one in 1000. Results of this regression are 
displayed in Table 4, infra.  
40 See infra Figure 16 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra Figure 8 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra Figure 19 and accompanying text. 
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considerably more likely to appear in court: only 7% of nondetained 
represented immigrants were removed in absentia, compared to 68% of pro 
se nondetained respondents.43  
While we do show robust, statistically significant correlations between 
representation and various case outcomes, we do not argue that 
representation causes the gains that we describe in this Article.44 Our 
investigation into the role of counsel in immigration courts is an 
observational study, based on hearing data, interviews, and court 
observations. As such, our project is a descriptive one, designed to reveal for 
the first time how the presence of counsel is associated with a range of 
adjudication issues of intense interest to policymakers, including the use of 
immigration detention, the geographic location of immigration courts, case 
adjudication times, and patterns in claimmaking and grants of relief.  
In many respects, this study confirms beliefs of those who are familiar 
with the immigration system: attorneys are scarce and their involvement is 
linked to asserting a winning defense and helping courts to do their work 
efficiently. Beyond such insights, this Article also contributes an evidence-
based understanding of the severity of the gaps in immigration 
representation and the complexities of the relationships among 
representation, deportation, and courts. As we develop further throughout 
this Article, these findings have immediate implications for the ongoing 
debate regarding expanding access to counsel for poor immigrants in 
removal proceedings.  
I. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL IN 
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURTS? 
Before continuing, it is useful to provide basic information regarding the 
trial-level immigration courts that are the subject of our study. The nation’s 
immigration courts are divided into sixty jurisdictions,45 known as “base 
 
43 See infra Figure 20 and accompanying text. 
44 Indeed, as we discuss in Section III.A, causal claims in this context would be problematic 
because attorneys are not randomly assigned to immigrants facing deportation. Instead, the 
immigrants decide whether they want to—and can afford to—pursue obtaining counsel, and the 
attorneys decide whether to take their cases. In the process, it is possible that only certain types of 
clients and cases get counsel, resulting in selection bias. James Greiner and Cassandra Pattanayak 
have referred to these methodological challenges facing observational studies as “client-induced” 
and “lawyer-induced” selection effects. D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, 
Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) 
Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2191-96 (2012). 
45 See EOIR Immigration Court Listing, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
sibpages/ICadr.htm [http://perma.cc/B4AH-2RJA] (last updated Aug. 2015) (indexing United 
States immigration courts by state). 
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cities.” The judges that preside over immigration cases are administrative 
law judges appointed by the Attorney General and serve as employees of 
the Department of Justice’s EOIR.46 They are not part of the federal 
judiciary and do not enjoy tenure like Article III judges.47  
This Article analyzes cases categorized as “removal proceedings,” the 
largest category of immigration decisions. Specifically, we focus on the 
1,206,633 removal cases decided on the merits by approximately 377 
different immigration judges during the six-year period from 2007 to 2012.48 
Since 1997, the term “removal” has referred to the immigration judge’s 
decision whether an immigrant attempting to enter the United States may 
remain, or whether one already in the United States must be deported.49  
It is helpful to clarify what is not included in this study. First, our study 
excludes immigration enforcement decisions that are not made by 
immigration judges.50 Indeed, a majority of immigrants removed from the 
country between 2007 and 2012 never saw an immigration judge.51 Instead, 
they were deported based on administrative procedures such as “expedited 
removal”52 or “reinstatement of removal.”53 These types of summary 
expulsion procedures that deny immigrants judicial review of the merits of 
 
46 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012) (defining “immigration judge” as an attorney appointed by 
the Attorney General to serve as an “administrative judge” within EOIR).  
47 For an argument that immigration courts ought to be moved out of the Department of 
Justice and made into Article I courts, see Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress 
Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL., Jan. 1, 2008, at 3. 
48 A more detailed description of the data sample is contained in the Appendix. 
49 Prior to 1996, “exclusion” was the term used for arriving immigrants and “deportation” was 
used for those who were already present in the United States. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1994), 
with Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 
104-208, § 303(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-585 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012)). 
50 See generally Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 
23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 611-32 (2009) (summarizing the methods, aside from removal 
hearings, that the government uses to deport noncitizens). 
51 According to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) statistics, only 229,968 of the 
419,384 noncitizens (55%) removed from the United States in 2012 saw an immigration judge. 
JOHN F. SIMANSKI & LESLEY M. SAPP, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2012, at 6 tbl.7, 7 tbl.9 (Dec. 2013), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2012_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/2MME-B2DV]. 
52 Under the procedure known as “expedited removal,” persons apprehended at a port of 
entry (including airports, sea ports, and land border crossings) can be removed within two weeks 
of entry without the right to see an immigration judge. I.N.A. § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012); see also Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 
48,880 (Aug. 11, 2004) (authorizing the DHS to place a designated class of immigrants in 
expedited removal proceedings). 
53 “Reinstatement of removal” allows a prior removal order to be activated to again remove 
the immigrant, without a right to judicial review. I.N.A. § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012).  
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their cases are not considered in this Article.54 Second, our study only 
examines removal proceedings, which account for 97% of immigration court 
proceedings.55 Other proceeding types, including credible fear, reasonable 
fear, and rescission, are not analyzed.56 Finally, although immigration decisions 
may be appealed, our focus is exclusively on representation at the trial level.57 
Our research is guided by earlier pioneering studies of immigration 
courts. The first work in this area was performed by government and 
academic researchers who examined attorney representation in asylum cases 
and found that asylum petitioners were much more likely to win their cases 
when represented by counsel.58 Research published by the Vera Institute for 
 
54 For timely discussions of the growth in these types of “summary” or “speedy” 
administrative removal procedures, see generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed 
Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 (2014); Removal Without Recourse: 
The Growth of Summary Deportations from the United States, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Apr. 28, 2014), 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/removal-without-recourse-growth-summary-deport 
ations-united-states [http://perma.cc/FAD3-U37P]. For an excellent discussion of barriers to 
accessing counsel in these summary proceedings, see AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL LEGAL ACTION 
CTR. & PENN STATE LAW CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: AN 
OVERVIEW OF DHS RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO COUNSEL (May 2012), http://www.legalaction 
center.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Behind_Closed_Doors_5-31-12.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z62V-GXDF]. 
55 See 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at C3 tbl.3 (classifying 310,455 out of the 317,930 
proceedings received by the immigration courts in 2012 as “removal”). 
56 Other proceeding types include asylum only, continued detention review, Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), and withholding only. Id. at C2-C3. 
57 Immigration judge decisions may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), 
a panel composed of fifteen Board Members. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2015). Some cases may also 
be appealed to federal court. I.N.A. § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (2012). See generally David 
Hausman, The Failure of Immigration Appeals, 164 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (providing 
an insightful analysis of how immigration appellate review fails to promote uniformity in outcomes 
and presenting compelling policy suggestions for reform); Michael Kagan et al., Buying Time? False 
Assumptions About Abusive Appeals, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 679 (2014) (relying on empirical evidence to 
support policy reform for more liberal grants of stays of removal pending appeal). 
58 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-940, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM: 
SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND 
JUDGES 30 (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08940.pdf [http://perma.cc/CZ2B-268P] 
[hereinafter GAO ASYLUM REPORT] (“Representation generally doubled the likelihood of 
affirmative and defensive cases being granted asylum . . . .”); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 15, at 
340 (reporting that “[r]epresented asylum seekers were granted asylum at a rate of 45.6%, almost 
three times as high as the 16.3% grant rate for those without legal counsel”); Andrew I. Schoenholtz 
& Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 739-
40 (2002) (concluding that “[r]epresented asylum cases are four to six times more likely to succeed 
than pro se ones”); Immigration Judges, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (July 
31, 2006), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160 [http://perma.cc/H669-PQSD] (finding that 
64% of represented asylum cases were denied, compared to 93.4% of pro se asylum petitioners). 
Donald Kerwin’s 2004 essay reported similar divergences in win rates for represented versus pro se 
respondents for asylum, in addition to four other forms of relief. See Donald Kerwin, Charitable Legal 
Programs for Immigrants: What They Do, Why They Matter and How They Can Be Expanded, IMMIGR. 
BRIEFINGS, No. 04-6 (June 2004), at 1. 
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Justice in 2008 on the Department of Justice’s “Legal Orientation Program” 
stood out as the first attempt to examine the relationship between the 
provision of know-your-rights legal orientation and adjudication times in 
detained immigration cases.59 More recently, the Vera Institute partnered 
with local attorneys and scholars to author a pair of case studies of attorney 
representation in immigration courts in two cities—New York City and San 
Francisco. These studies reveal local disparities in detained and nondetained 
representation rates,60 as well as a correlation between representation by 
counsel and successful case outcomes.61 
Our project builds on this earlier research, while drawing on a national 
administrative database that offers novel possibilities for in-depth analysis. 
First, the sheer size of the sample examined in this Article makes it the 
largest academic study of immigration representation ever conducted.62 
Second, our study is the first to systematically analyze information in EOIR’s 
court records regarding the attorneys who appear in immigration court. 
Careful review and coding allowed us to take into account meaningful aspects 
of attorney involvement, including whether attorneys appeared in court, when 
continuances were granted to seek representation, and which types of 
attorney organizations provided representation in immigration courts.  
A. Case-Level Representation 
What does it mean to be represented by an attorney in United States 
immigration courts? The answer to this question is crucial to any study of 
attorney representation. To date, however, scholars have not given this 
 
59 The Vera Institute’s work did not focus on the provision of full-service legal assistance, but 
rather on participation in know-your-rights sessions. VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 48 
(finding that participation in know-your-rights sessions by detained immigrants reduced case 
adjudication time by an average of thirteen days). 
60 The New York City case study found that nondetained immigrants were represented 79% of the 
time, while detained immigrants were represented 33% of the time. New York Immigrant 
Representation, supra note 14, at 368 tbl.1. The San Francisco case study results were similar: never-
detained immigrants were represented 84% of the time, whereas detained immigrants were represented 
33% of the time. REPRESENTATION IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, supra note 14, at 17 fig.1. Our work 
shows that these representation rates in New York and San Francisco are much higher than the national 
average of only 65% for never-detained immigrants and 14% for detained immigrants.  See infra Figure 5. 
61 Nondetained immigrants represented by counsel in New York City were almost six times 
more likely to have a successful outcome than their pro se counterparts. New York Immigrant 
Representation, supra note 14, at 384 fig.7. In San Francisco, detained immigrants with counsel were 
three times more likely than pro se detained litigants to succeed. REPRESENTATION IN NORTHERN 
CALIFORNIA, supra note 14, at 9. Using similar measurements in our national data, we find that 
detained respondents were ten-and-a-half times more likely to succeed than their pro se counterparts, 
and nondetained respondents were three-and-a-half times more likely to succeed. See infra Figure 14. 
62 See supra notes 14–16 (comparing sample sizes of previous studies of EOIR data).  
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threshold question much attention. Therefore, this Section begins by 
addressing the importance of the method chosen to assess attorney 
involvement in immigration court. It then proceeds to describe the depth 
and type of immigration representation that currently exists in United 
States immigration courts. 
Although there is no right to appointed counsel at government 
expense,63 respondents in immigration removal proceedings must be advised 
of their right to be represented.64 Generally, this reading of rights occurs at 
the first hearing in immigration court, known in practice as the “master 
calendar hearing.”65 To assist immigrants in this process, judges are required 
to distribute a list of free and low-cost legal services to immigrants who 
appear before them.66 When an attorney takes on a case, he or she must file 
a “Notice of Entry of Appearance” form with the immigration court, known 
as the “EOIR-28,” advising the judge that the immigrant has 
representation.67 
 
63 See I.N.A. § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012) (“In any removal proceedings before an 
immigration judge and in any appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any such 
removal proceedings, the person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no 
expense to the Government) by such counsel . . . as he shall choose.”). For legal arguments that 
immigrants facing deportation from the United States ought to be entitled to appointed counsel, 
see generally Robert N. Black, Due Process and Deportation—Is There a Right to Assigned Counsel?, 8 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289 (1975); Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent 
Residents, 122 YALE L.J. 2394 (2013); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1299 (2011); Beth J. Werlin, Note, Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed 
Counsel in Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393 (2000). 
64 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1) (2015). 
65 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION 
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.15(a) (2009), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/ 
2015/02/02/practice_manual_review.pdf [http://perma.cc/M7NQ-LQ6S] [hereinafter COURT 
PRACTICE MANUAL] (“A respondent’s first appearance before an Immigration Judge in removal 
proceedings is at a master calendar hearing.”). Federal regulations provide that the right to counsel 
applies to all immigration hearings, including master calendar hearings, bond hearings, and merits 
hearings. 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) (2015). 
66 Id. § 1240.10(a)(1)-(3). See also Leslie v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 611 F.3d 171, 180 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (finding that an immigration judge who failed to advise the respondent of the existence 
of free legal services violated the respondent’s statutory right to counsel under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1240.10(a)(2), necessitating reversal even without a showing of prejudice). For a copy of the list 
of free providers, see Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Free Legal Services Providers, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/probono/states.htm [http://perma.cc/C2CP-
CF6G] (last updated July 29, 2015).  
67 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17(a) (2015); Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative Before 
the Immigration Court, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoirforms/eoir28.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/E77K-GPLJ] (last updated July 2015).  During the time period of our study, when 
a representative filed an EOIR-28, he or she generally assumed the responsibility to represent the 
immigrant in all of the respondent’s future proceedings before the immigration court.  As a result 
of EOIR regulations, immigration representatives may now enter an appearance in a custody 
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The filing of the EOIR-28 form has provided the standard government 
metric for statistically analyzing whether an immigrant is “represented” in 
immigration court. For example, in EOIR’s annual reports, so long as the 
EOIR-28 form is filed at some point during the lifetime of the litigation, 
the immigrant is counted as “represented” for the entire case.68 However, 
this technique has a shortcoming: the attorney may have joined the case 
only after the judge decided to order the immigrant removed or, if the 
immigrant applied for relief, after the judge denied the immigrant’s 
application to remain lawfully in the United States. In an attempt to correct 
this problem, the Vera Institute of Justice, in consultation with EOIR, 
adopted a methodology for counting representation that excluded all 
individuals with EOIR-28 representation forms filed after the conclusion of 
the merits proceeding.69 This technique suffers from a different problem: 
the EOIR database can only accommodate one date for the filing of the 
EOIR-28 form, so when more than one form is filed during the life of a 
case, the filing date no longer captures the date when the attorney initially 
entered the case.70 
To more accurately measure attorney representation, this study counts 
immigrants as represented if: (1) an EOIR-28 was filed with the court prior 
to the completion of the merits proceeding; or (2) an EOIR-28 form was 
filed after the judge reached the decision on the merits, but an attorney 
appeared in at least one hearing within the relevant merits proceeding.71 
A related and more crucial issue regarding attorney representation is the 
decision to assess representation at the proceeding level or, instead, at the 
individual case level. A single immigration case is divided into what are known 
as “proceedings.” Each proceeding contains one or more hearing. Although 
many cases have only one proceeding, a more complex case may have multiple 
proceedings before a judge reaches a decision on the merits. For instance, if 
 
proceeding without assuming the responsibility to represent the immigrant through the entire 
case.  See infra note 86. 
68 We were able to replicate EOIR’s attorney representation statistics by relying on the 
EOIR-28 field as a marker of attorney representation. See 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at G1 
(“Prior to representing an alien before the immigration court, a representative must file a Notice 
of Entry of Appearance with the court.”); see also BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 27, at 57 
(explaining that EOIR statistical reports “probably overstate the actual level of representation 
because respondents in some proceedings coded as ‘represented’ were not represented for the 
entire proceeding”). 
69 See VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 59 n.76, 83-84. 
70 See id. at 84 (“If there is a change in representation within the same proceeding, the E-28 
date and name of legal representative will be overwritten.”); see also infra note 208. 
71 The number of cases with late-filed EOIR-28 forms is small (n = 35,119) and approximately 
half of these cases had an attorney appear in at least one hearing during the merits proceeding (n = 
17,253). For additional discussion of our coding methodology, see infra Appendix, Part A. 
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the immigrant requests a change of venue in one proceeding (e.g., to be 
transferred to a city closer to family), a judge does not reach the merits of the 
case until the second proceeding in the new venue.  
 EOIR’s reporting during the period of this study was based on 
proceeding-level representation.72 Yet this proceeding-level method yields 
an inflated national representation rate because it counts cases with multiple 
proceedings multiple times. This counting method matters because 
immigrants with representation are more than twice as likely as those 
without representation to have more than one proceeding.73 To avoid this 
problem of over-counting represented respondents, this Article uses a case-
level method for measuring representation rates.74  
By thus accounting for the point at which the attorney joined the case 
and moving to a case-level approach, we find that only 37% of immigrants 
were represented by counsel in cases decided during the six-year period 
from 2007 to 2012.75 On a year-by-year basis, as reflected in the dashed line 
in Figure 1, between 32% and 45% of immigrants were represented. This 
assessment of attorney representation is as much as 13.6 percentage points 
lower than one that relies on proceeding-level analysis of representation 
rates, as depicted in the vertical line of Figure 1. 
 
72 See, e.g., 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at G1 fig.9 (displaying percentage of “Court 
Proceedings Completed by Representation Status”). Other researchers who rely on EOIR data 
have replicated this proceeding-level method of counting representation. See, e.g., BENSON & 
WHEELER, supra note 27, at 20 (relying on a proceeding-level analysis to conclude that slightly 
over half the respondents in proceedings completed in 2011 had counsel).  
73 Using the entire EOIR database (N = 6,165,128), 34% of cases with only one proceeding 
have an EOIR-28 on file, compared to 73% of cases with more than one proceeding (p < .001, two-
tailed difference of proportions test).  
74 Beginning in 2013, EOIR abandoned the proceeding-level method of analysis, instead 
moving to an “initial case completion” method of accounting. This method reduces much of the 
over-counting problem but still results in a slightly higher representation rate than our calculation 
because it includes “other completions” in the representation statistic. EXEC. OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2013 STATISTICS YEARBOOK C2 fig.5, 
C4 fig.6, F1 fig.10, (2014) [hereinafter 2013 YEARBOOK]. Other completions include 
administrative closures, which are not immigration decisions on the merits, and may later be 
followed by another proceeding in which the merits of the case is evaluated. See id. at C4 (“Cases 
that are not decided on their merits are classified as other completions.”). According to EOIR’s 
own accounting, these “other completions” constituted 17% of “initial case completions” in fiscal 
year 2013. Id. at C1. For additional discussion of the treatment of administrative closures in this 
Article, see infra Appendix, Part B. 
75 This 37% rate for case-level representation held constant when we looked at all types of 
cases decided on their merits, as depicted in Figure 1 (n = 1,225,917), as well as when we examined 
only removal cases in our National Sample (n = 1,206,633). See infra Appendix, Part B. 
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Figure 1: Proceeding-Level Versus Case-Level Analysis of Representation  
in Immigration Court, 2007–2012 (All Proceeding Types)76 
 
Note: “Proceeding-Level” measures the percent of all proceedings where an EOIR-28 form 
was filed at some point in the case. In contrast, “Case-Level” measures the percent of all cases 
where an EOIR-28 form was filed prior to the conclusion of the merits proceeding or, if an 
EOIR-28 form was filed after that completion date, an attorney appeared at one or more 
hearings. The greatest difference between the two is 13.6% in 2011 (shown by the vertical 
short-dashed line). 
 
Another central part of the standard story about immigration 
representation is that the national rate of representation is increasing 
rapidly. In our replication of EOIR’s proceeding-level statistical approach 
(as shown in Figure 1), the rate of representation of immigrants increased 
by thirteen percentage points from 2009 to 2012. This rise in representation 
has been attributed to vigorous pro bono efforts77 and increasing 
effectiveness of court-based know-your-rights programs.78 
 
76 Figure 1 contains all cases decided by immigration judges on their merits during the time 
period studied, regardless of proceeding type. All other figures in this Article contain only 
removal proceedings.  
77 See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the 
Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 
55 (2006) (“There has been a remarkable growth in immigration practice not only among those 
attorneys who specialize in the field, but also in the pro bono and non-profit services available to 
aid the non-citizens.”). 
78 For example, EOIR touts its Office of Legal Access Programs as working to “increase rates of 
representation for immigrants appearing before the Immigration Courts” by, among other initiatives, 
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While the rate of representation did rise during the six years studied, 
what has gone relatively unnoticed is the relationship between the number 
of individual removal respondents who obtained representation and the 
overall volume of removal cases. Notably, as shown in Figure 2, the number 
of removal cases decided by immigration judges on the merits decreased 
sharply from a high of 215,451 in 2009 to a low of 169,023 in 2012. This 
fluctuation in decisions reached on the merits is important to understanding 
attorney representation. Contrary to the usual account of an expanding pool 
of attorney representation, our analysis reveals that the number of 
immigrants who obtained representation over time remained relatively flat: 
in 2007, 74,955 cases decided on the merits had counsel, compared to 76,336 
cases in 2012. Thus, increasing representation rates appear to be more a 
matter of decreasing volume of judicial decisions, rather than increasing 
involvement of attorney representatives. 
 
Figure 2: Relationship Between Number of Represented Removal Cases and 
Total Number of Removal Cases, 2007–2012 
 
Although an accurate understanding of case-level immigrant 
representation is a crucial starting point, it only begins to describe how 
representation functions in practice. For immigrants with counsel, do their 
 
“creat[ing] new incentives for attorneys and law students to accept pro bono cases.” Office of Legal 
Access Programs, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-legal-access-programs [http://perma.cc/7VQ6-GTWS] (last 
updated Apr. 30, 2015).  
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attorneys appear at all of their court hearings? What categories of 
immigration charges and claims for relief obtain representation in court? 
And, what types of attorneys take on immigration cases—large firms, solo 
practitioners, nonprofits, or law school clinics? The next Sections tackle 
these vital questions. 
B. Hearing-Level Representation 
The previous Section established that 63% of removal cases had no 
attorney representation by the time of the judge’s merits decision. But, for 
those immigrants who did obtain representation, how often did their 
attorney appear in court? Typically, the merits proceeding begins with the 
initial master calendar hearing.79 More court dates may be set until the 
judge reaches the final decision on the merits.80  
To measure attorney courtroom involvement, we analyzed the hearing-
level characteristics of the removal cases we counted as represented (n = 
447,152).81 EOIR maintains a database for every hearing scheduled in a 
given case, which includes a unique EOIR attorney identification number 
for counsel present at any hearing (including master calendar hearings, 
custody hearings, and individual hearings). We used this coding to 
determine whether attorneys in represented cases were present at their 
clients’ hearings. Our findings from this analysis of attorney presence in 
court are displayed in Figure 3. 
 
79  COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 65, § 4.15(a). 
80 See infra Table 7 (calculating a mean of seven court hearings in nondetained cases with 
applications for relief). 
81 For a description of the coding of hearing-level data, see infra Appendix, Part A. 
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Figure 3: Attorney Presence at Hearings in Represented  
Removal Cases, 2007–201282 
 
Note: Among represented respondents overall, attorneys are present for an average of 70%  
(SD = 34%) of total hearings. 
 
In the previous Section, we reported that only 37% of immigrants were 
represented by counsel during the six-year period of our study. However, 
our hearing-level analysis reveals that our measurement of attorney 
involvement in removal cases may still be over-inclusive. On average, 
attorneys were recorded as present in court for 70% of the court hearings of 
their represented clients. For 11% of the cases we counted as represented, no 
attorney was recorded as ever appearing in court. Figure 3 provides 
additional breakdowns in frequency of attorney presence in represented 
removal cases. 
Our analysis also enables us to identify when attorneys were most likely 
to be present in court.83 We find that almost all of these missed hearings 
 
82 Figure 3 includes all removal cases decided on the merits between 2007 and 2012, both 
detained and nondetained. In measuring attorney representation in Figure 3, presence by 
telephone or video counted as presence in court. Hearings not likely to have taken place (i.e., 
judicial absence, scheduling conflict, or data entry error) were excluded from the analysis. In less 
than 1% of the 447,152 cases we counted as represented (n = 3813), no hearing-level data were 
available. Accordingly, these cases were excluded from this analysis.  
83 Earlier researchers have been frustrated by their inability, without hearing-level data, to 
determine whether an immigrant only received partial representation. See, e.g., VERA 
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occurred early in the court process, rather than at the trial stage. At the 
initial master calendar hearing, attorneys were only recorded as present 54% 
of the time. However, attorneys were almost always present when their 
clients’ cases proceeded to trial. In these trials, which are known in practice 
as “individual calendar hearings,”84 attorneys were recorded as present 95% of 
the time.85 These patterns are also consistent with our court visits, in which 
attorneys were particularly scarce at the master calendar stage. 
These findings provide critical context to the meaning of representation 
in immigration court. Just because an attorney eventually joins a case does 
not necessarily mean that the immigrant obtained full-service 
representation in every hearing.86 Although we do find that immigration 
attorneys were almost always present at trial (if there was one), attorney 
involvement was notably incomplete earlier in the process. 
C. Case Type 
For what sorts of cases do attorneys provide representation? This 
Section answers this question from a number of different procedural 
perspectives, including by charge type, case outcome, and client type. In so 
doing, this Section introduces readers unfamiliar with immigration court to 
a few technical aspects of removal proceedings.  
 
 
EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 84 (“[W]e are unable in this analysis to distinguish between 
representation for the bond hearing only and representation in the removal proceeding.”). 
84 “Individual calendar hearings” are held when the judge determines that there is a contested 
issue of law or fact. See COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 65, § 4.16(a) (“Evidentiary hearings 
on contested matters are referred to as individual calendar hearings or merits hearings.”). 
85 Among represented cases, 53% had an individual calendar hearing during our six-year 
study period. In contrast, only 5% of pro se cases had an individual calendar hearing. 
86 Ironically, immigration courts generally disfavor “limited appearances” in which attorneys 
only appear for limited purposes. See, e.g., Matter of Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377, 384 (B.I.A. 
1986) (finding that a legal representative cannot enter a limited appearance in an immigration 
proceeding). However, experts have started to recommend that EOIR allow limited appearances at 
least for bond hearings. See, e.g., BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 27, at 66 (“EOIR should 
encourage use of limited appearance in appropriate circumstances . . . .”). New EOIR regulations 
will allow limited appearances for purposes of bond hearings. See Separate Representation for 
Custody and Bond Proceedings, 80 Fed. Reg. 59,499 (Oct. 1, 2015) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 
1003) (allowing attorneys to “enter an appearance in custody and bond proceedings without such 
appearance constituting an entry of appearance for all of the alien’s proceedings before the 
Immigration Court”). 
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Figure 4: Attorney Representation in Removal Cases,  
by Case Type, 2007–2012 
 
Note: “Total Cases” is the total number of removal cases in that category. “Percent 
Represented” is the percent of removal cases nationwide in that category. The dashed vertical 
line is the percent of all respondents with counsel during this period (37%). 
 
The top portion of Figure 4 analyzes six years of removal decisions by 
prosecutorial charge type. Removal cases begin when the Department of 
Homeland Security files a charge against the immigrant, known as the 
“Notice to Appear.”87 Some Notices to Appear contain charges based on 
civil violations of the immigration law, such as entry without inspection.88 
Other Notices to Appear contain immigration charges based on criminal law 
violations, such as the commission of an aggravated felony that renders a 
lawful permanent resident deportable.89  
 
87 Notices to Appear, also referred to as Forms I-862, may be initiated by the different 
enforcement arms of DHS—Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), and United States Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS). Prior to the 
enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, the 
charging document was known as an Order to Show Cause. 
88 See I.N.A. § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012) (classifying certain individuals as not eligible 
for admission, such as those who have “communicable disease[s] of public health significance”).  
89 I.N.A. § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). For an argument that the 
current immigration removal system fails to engage in sufficient weighing of individual case 
equities, “especially in cases that concern noncitizens who have criminal history,” see Jason A. 
Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 59), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2614149 [http://perma.cc/9K6E-28QC]. 
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During the study period, 85% of removal cases were based on civil 
immigration charges and only 15% on criminal immigration charges.90 
Interestingly, we find that immigrants charged with removal based on a 
criminal violation were only slightly less likely to find counsel than those 
with civil charges: 35% versus 37% representation rates, respectively.  
The middle portion of Figure 4 tracks representation rates through the 
removal court process. In the first stage of removal, the judge decides whether 
to sustain the charges contained in the government’s Notice to Appear. If the 
Notice to Appear does not state a valid ground for removal, the judge must 
terminate the case.91 For example, the judge will terminate the case if the 
respondent is a United States citizen or a lawful permanent resident not 
subject to removal. For cases that are terminated, the immigrant will be 
allowed to remain in the United States. We therefore count termination as a 
successful outcome for the immigrant later in this Article.92 
If the immigrant is found to be removable, he or she will be ordered 
removed unless he or she pursues an application for relief in the second 
stage of the proceeding.93 For example, an immigrant may be eligible for 
asylum based on a well-founded fear of persecution.94 If the judge grants 
the relief application, the immigrant is allowed to remain in the United 
States. If, however, the application is denied, the immigrant is required to 
leave the United States.95 Finally, a noncitizen in removal proceedings may 
also apply for permission to leave the United States “voluntarily” instead of 
by order of the immigration judge. By obtaining what is known as voluntary 
departure,96 the immigrant pays for the return trip and avoids some of the 
bars to future lawful readmission.97 
 
90 Because the government may bring multiple charges against a respondent, we categorized 
each case by the most serious charge brought against the respondent. See infra Appendix, Part A. 
91 See I.N.A. § 240(c)(3)(A), U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012) (requiring “clear and convincing 
evidence” to find that an admitted alien is deportable); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8 (2015) (clarifying the 
burdens of proof in removal proceedings for several classes of aliens).  
92 See infra Figure 14. 
93 Immigration judges have an obligation to advise respondents of the right to seek relief 
from removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (2015). 
94 See I.N.A. § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012) (allowing aliens in the United States to apply for 
asylum and prescribing procedures for being granted refugee status). 
95 As mentioned in note 57, supra, immigrants may also appeal a denial of an application for 
relief. In our National Sample, 54% of cases in which relief was denied were followed by an appeal 
to the Board of Immigration Appeals. As David Hausman’s research on immigration appeals 
reveals, some of these appeals were by the immigrant, and others by the government. Immigrants 
without counsel are significantly less likely to appeal. Hausman, supra note 57.  
96 See I.N.A. § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2012) (permitting an alien to leave the United States 
voluntarily instead of being found deportable); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(b) (2015) (same). 
97 Immigration judges are limited in their ability to offer more intermediate forms of relief, 
such as a temporary deportation or probationary relief. For arguments that judges ought to be able 
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As seen in the middle portion of Figure 4, 72% of immigrants who 
obtained termination were represented. For unrepresented litigants, most 
cases resulted in the judge sustaining the charges in the Notice to Appear 
and finding the immigrant subject to removal. Figure 4 also highlights that 
only 17% of the immigrants who were removed without filing any 
application for relief did so with the advice of counsel. Of those seeking 
relief, 86% were represented by counsel, revealing just how rare it is to 
represent oneself in a relief application. An impressive 95% of immigrants 
who were granted relief between 2007 and 2012 were represented by 
counsel. Relief applicants who obtained voluntary departure also had high 
levels of representation (88%).98 
The bottom portion of Figure 4 contains statistics regarding three other 
aspects of case type that are correlated with differences in access to counsel. 
First, children were more likely than adults to be represented by counsel: 
55% of children received representation.99 Second, cases of immigrants 
undergoing removal while serving prison terms in an EOIR program known 
as the Institutional Hearing Program (IHP)100 were very unlikely to obtain 
counsel: only 9% of IHP respondents were represented.101 Third, 
immigrants who agreed to their own removal through a process known as 
“stipulated removal”102 were only represented in 4% cases.103  
 
to grant intermediate sanctions that are in proportion to the underlying misconduct, see Juliet 
Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683 (2009), and Michael J. Wishnie, 
Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415 (2012). 
98 In Figure 4 we show voluntary departure separate from removal. However, for most 
purposes in this Article voluntary departure is treated as a form of removal, because the immigrant 
must leave the country. This approach follows that adopted by EOIR, which defines voluntary 
departure as “a form of removal, not a type of relief.” 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at Q1. 
99 This is compared to only 37% of adults. We investigated this finding further and found that 29% 
of represented children, compared to only 6% of represented adults, obtained free representation from 
nonprofit organizations, law school clinics, or large firms providing pro bono representation. We analyze 
attorney types further in Sections I.D & III.A, infra. For an argument that child migrants ought to be 
allowed to play a greater role in securing the lawful admission of their family members, see Stephen Lee, 
Growing Up Outside the Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1405 (2015) (book review). 
100 The IHP implements a 1986 congressional mandate that “the Attorney General shall 
begin any deportation proceeding as expeditiously as possible after the date of the conviction” for 
noncitizens convicted of deportable offenses. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. No. 99-603, § 701, 100 Stat. 3359, 3445 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012)). See also 
2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at P1 (describing the IHP as “a cooperative effort between EOIR; 
DHS; and various federal, state, and municipal corrections agencies”). 
101 This is compared to 38% of non-IHP removal cases. 
102 Under this procedure, the judge does not need to evaluate the merits of the case, but 
rather simply determines if unrepresented respondents signed the agreement voluntarily. See 
I.N.A. § 240(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (2012) (directing the Attorney General to promulgate a 
regulation governing stipulated removals); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2015) (“If the alien is 
 
  
2015] A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court 25 
 
In conclusion, this Section shows that attorney representation in 
immigration cases is distributed almost equally across criminal and civil 
cases. However, represented cases have remarkably different procedural 
patterns: they are more likely to be terminated and involve applications for 
relief. Finally, while juveniles have higher than average representation rates, 
other vulnerable groups, such as immigrants held in prison or who stipulate 
to their removal, are very unlikely to obtain representation. 
D. Attorney Type 
EOIR maintains a record of attorney-level characteristics for each 
attorney who appears in the nation’s immigration courts. These 
characteristics include attorney name, firm name, and firm address. They 
also include a unique EOIR attorney identification number that is added to 
the hearing-level data when that attorney appears in court.104 In total, there 
were 48,305 unique attorney identification numbers in the hearings of 
represented immigrants between 2007 and 2012.105 It is important to 
acknowledge that these attorney identification numbers included 
nonattorneys working for nonprofit organizations and certified to appear in 
court as “accredited representatives.”106  
 
unrepresented, the Immigration Judge must determine that the alien’s waiver is voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent.”).  
103 Our research demonstrates that these stipulated removal orders are almost always secured 
without the advice of counsel. Later in this Article we show that 20% of pro se respondents were 
removed with a stipulated removal order during the six-year period of our study. See infra Table 1 and 
accompanying text. Moreover, nonprofit organizations were the most likely among the different 
attorney types to take on cases where stipulated removal orders had been signed by the respondent. 
See infra Table 1 and accompanying text. For additional background on some of the issues associated 
with stipulated removal orders, see Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders 
of Removal and the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475, 509-11 (2013); Removal 
Without Recourse: The Growth of Summary Deportations from the United States, supra note 54. 
104 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
105 Note that any given attorney may have multiple associated EOIR attorney identification 
numbers. For example, an attorney may change firms or the firm name may change. Additionally, 
attorneys who practice in different jurisdictions appear to be appointed a new EOIR attorney 
identification number. 
106 8 C.F.R. § 1292.2(a) (2015) (permitting “nonprofit religious, charitable, social service, or 
similar organization[s]” to designate representatives to practice in immigration courts). We 
classified any accredited representatives appearing in the data as nonprofit organization 
representation (based on the name and address of the employer). As explained infra, Figure 5, just 
5% of national representation was provided by nonprofit organizations, only some of which was 
provided by accredited representatives. Erin Corcoran has argued that one overlooked strategy for 
expanding access to immigration representation at a lower cost is funding accredited 
representatives, rather than licensed attorneys. Erin B. Corcoran, Bypassing Civil Gideon: A 
Legislative Proposal to Address the Rising Costs and Unmet Legal Needs of Unrepresented Immigrants, 115 
W. VA. L. REV. 643 (2012). Recent research on nonlawyer representation in unemployment 
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To characterize the type of attorney associated with each represented 
case, we coded these unique attorney identification numbers based on the 
type of organization where the attorney was employed.107 The 
organizational types occurring in the EOIR data included nonprofit 
organizations,108 law school clinics,109 and law firms. We then divided law 
firms into three different categories: (1) solo practitioners and small firms of 
10 or fewer attorneys; (2) medium firms of 11 to 100 attorneys; and (3) large 
firms of more than 100 attorneys. Finally, a small number of other 
organizational types were also present but not in high enough numbers for 
analysis. These included government lawyers, in-house counsel, and public 
defender organizations. 
Our findings reveal that the lion’s share of immigration representation 
was handled by small firms and solo practitioners. As displayed in Figure 5, 
90% of all removal representation was provided by small firms and solo 
practitioners. The remaining 10% of representation was distributed across 
nonprofit organizations,110 law school clinics, medium firms, and large firms 
(primarily providing pro bono representation). Another portion of 
representation involved “hybrid” representation, in which an immigrant had 
more than one institutional form of representation. For example, some cases 
began with a small firm but later obtained nonprofit representation.111 
 
insurance appeals suggests that while nonlawyers may be helpful in navigating common procedural 
and substantive issues, they are less well equipped to advance novel legal theories or challenge 
judges on disputed areas of substantive and procedural law. See Anna E. Carpenter, Alyx Mark & 
Colleen F. Shanahan, Trial and Error: Lawyers and Nonlawyer Advocates, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
(forthcoming 2015) (on file with author).  
107 For additional information on our coding method, see infra Appendix, Part A.  
108 Nonprofits included organizations such as Asian Law Caucus, American Friends Service 
Committee, Catholic Charities, and Human Rights First.  
109 Law students may appear in immigration court under the supervision of licensed 
attorneys or an accredited representative. 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(2) (2015). We classified law students 
based on the organization type of their supervisory organization, primarily law school clinics. 
110 For a comprehensive discussion of the limitations placed on legal assistance organizations 
that reduce their ability to represent immigrants, see Geoffrey Heeren, Illegal Aid: Legal Assistance 
to Immigrants in the United States, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 619 (2011). 
111 We found similar representation patterns to those in Figure 5 when we analyzed detained 
cases separately. For detained respondents, 88% were represented by small firms. The remaining 
12% were distributed as follows: nonprofits (68%); law school clinics (6.3%); medium firms (11.4%); 
large firms (5%); and hybrid representation (9.3%). 
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Figure 5: Types of Attorneys in Removal Cases, 2007–2012112 
  
Note: “Small Firms” included 10 or fewer attorneys, “Medium Firms” included 11 to 100 
attorneys, and “Large Firms” included more than 100 attorneys. “Hybrid” means more than 
one organization type represented the respondent. 
 
Not only does this analysis reveal the dominant role of small and solo 
practitioners in providing immigration representation, but it also 
underscores the scarcity of free legal services for low-income immigrants. 
Free legal services for the poor were provided by nonprofit organizations, 
law school clinics, and large firms providing pro bono representation.113 Yet 
these three forms of representation combined accounted for only 7% of 
overall representation in immigration courts. Since only 37% of immigrants 
obtained representation, just under 2% of all immigrants facing removal 
during our study period obtained pro bono legal services from nonprofit 
organizations, law school clinics, or large firms.  
 
112 For purposes of conducting the analysis in Figure 5, cases with representation from public 
defender organizations, in-house counsel, and government attorneys (less than .04% of cases)  
were excluded. 
113 Factors that lead us to categorize large firm work as pro bono include the absence of 
immigration law as a practice area on the website of most of the large law firms, the presence of 
organized pro bono programs within these firms, and the frequent occurrence of immigration case 
transfers to these firms from nonprofit organizations within our data. For a discussion of the 
growing role of institutionalized pro bono at large law firms, see Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of 
Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2004).  
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We recognize that this is an estimate, not an exact measure of pro bono 
participation. Because we classify all work of large law firms as pro bono, we 
necessarily overestimate somewhat the amount of pro bono services offered 
by large firms. However, we also underestimate somewhat the level of pro 
bono representation because the data do not allow us to measure the extent 
to which small and medium firms may be providing pro bono legal 
services.114 Still, the salient point here is that pro bono legal services in 
removal proceedings are extremely scarce.  
We next investigated whether client characteristics and claim-seeking 
patterns differed by type of representation. The results of this analysis are 
displayed in Table 1. Our research reveals that the attorney types we 
identify have quite different patterns in both the clients they represent and 
their litigation patterns on behalf of their clients.  
The right side of Table 1 highlights the differences in filing patterns of 
immigration attorneys on behalf of their clients. Here, the filing patterns of 
large law firms are noteworthy. The majority of removal work handled by large 
law firms (62%) involved asylum cases, the greatest proportion of any 
organization type.115 Large law firms were also the least likely to forgo filing an 
application for relief or to seek only voluntary departure.  
 
 
114 We recognize that some small firm lawyers have been leaders in pro bono representation 
efforts, including the recently established CARA Family Detention Pro Bono Project that provides 
free legal services for women and children detained in Dilley, Texas. See CARA Pro Bono Project, 
supra note 10. A study by Rebecca Sandefur estimates that 18% of lawyers nationwide perform 
some sort of pro bono legal work. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and American-
Style Civil Legal Assistance, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 79, 96 tbl.2 (2007). Among attorneys in private 
practice, those employed by large law firms provide the highest number of pro bono hours. 
Moreover, on average attorneys working at firms of over 100 lawyers perform more pro bono work 
than attorneys at small firms. See THE ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUB. 
SERV. SUPPORTING JUSTICE III: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMERICA’S 
LAWYERS 5 (Mar. 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/probono_ 
public_service/ls_pb_Supporting_Justice_III_final.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/E764-3F6D]. 
115 Much of this pro bono work by large law firms has been facilitated by nonprofit mentoring 
and training programs that pair asylum seekers with lawyers from top United States law firms. One 
such model program, Human Rights First, estimates that “attorneys from firms across the nation 
donate over 60,000 hours of their time annually” to Human Rights First cases. See Press Release, 
Human Rights First, Human Rights First Expands Award-Winning Pro-Bono Asylum Representation 
Program (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/human-rights-first-expands-
award-winning-pro-bono-asylum-representation-program [http://perma.cc/BD3P-YTX7].  
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Table 1: Client Characteristics and Application Patterns in Removal  
Caseloads, by Attorney Type, 2007–2012 
 Client Characteristics (%) Application Patterns (%) 
Detained IHP SRO 
No App. 
or VD 
VD 
Only Asylum 
Small Firm 18.3 0.4 0.2 12.0 18.9 39.3 
Medium 
Firm 
13.5 0.4 0.2 8.7 16.4      47.0 
Large Firm 14.0 0.4 0.1 8.5 10.7 61.6 
Nonprofit 30.0 1.9 5.4 24.3 17.9      28.4 
Law School 
Clinic 
18.9 0.5 0.0 11.7 17.4 37.9 
Hybrid 14.4 0.2 0.1 9.4 13.2      39.2 
Pro Se 75.7 3.4    20.1 81.6 13.2  3.7 
Note: Table 1 reports (by attorney type) the percent of attorney caseload that fits different client 
characteristics and application patterns. “IHP” stands for Institutional Hearing Program. “SRO” 
stands for Stipulated Removal Order. Analysis of application patterns is among cases that were not 
terminated by the judge. “No App. or VD” signifies no application for relief or voluntary departure 
was filed. “VD Only” signifies only an application for voluntary departure was filed. “Asylum” 
signifies at least one application for asylum, withholding under convention against torture, or 
asylum withholding. See infra Appendix, Part A. 
 
Particularly notable is the contrast between pro se patterns in relief 
seeking and that of all attorney groups. Among pro see respondents, 82% 
filed no claim for relief or voluntary departure. Even more shocking, only 
4% of removal respondents without counsel filed a claim for asylum.116 
The left side of Table 1 highlights the differences in client characteristics 
by attorney type. Here, nonprofits were distinct in that their work was 
heavily focused on the most vulnerable of immigrants in removal. 
Compared to all other attorney types, nonprofits had the highest proportion 
of their caseloads dedicated to immigrants in detention (30%), in prison as 
part of the IHP (2%), and subject to stipulated removal orders (5%). 
Nonprofit attorneys explained in our interviews that they often obtained 
clients through know-your-rights programs in jails and prisons and 
prioritized those cases that were most unlikely to obtain private counsel.  
Given these indicators of the nonprofit client base, it is perhaps not 
surprising that nonprofits were the least likely of any provider type to seek 
 
116 Sabrineh Ardalan has described the extreme barriers facing asylum-eligible respondents in 
applying for relief, many of whom may not even be aware of the asylum protections available to 
them. Sabrineh Ardalan, Access to Justice for Asylum Seekers: Developing an Effective Model of Holistic 
Asylum Representation, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1001, 1017 (2015). 
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relief or voluntary departure on behalf of their clients: 24% of their cases 
included no application for relief or voluntary departure. Nonprofit 
attorneys were also the least likely of any attorney type to represent asylum 
seekers: only 28% of their cases included an asylum application. This lower 
level of claim-seeking among nonprofits could result from a scarcity of 
nonprofit resources to pursue claims for all clients.117 It could also reflect 
that there were fewer meritorious cases in their client base, which included 
more detained, IHP, and stipulated removal cases. 
Thus far, this Article has revealed many striking facts about the ways in 
which counsel is distributed to immigrants in removal cases. During our study 
period, 63% of immigrants lacked representation. Although the percentage of 
individuals represented gradually increased over time, the total number of 
immigrants who appeared before immigration courts with counsel remained 
relatively constant. Immigrants in removal were also unlikely to seek relief 
unless represented: only 14% of relief applicants did so without counsel. 
Finally, the overwhelming majority of immigrants who obtained counsel were 
represented by solo and small firm practitioners. 
II. UNEQUAL ACCESS TO IMMIGRATION REPRESENTATION 
Part II builds on the foundational elements of immigration representation 
introduced in Part I to tell a more nuanced story about which immigrants 
receive representation. How do representation rates differ based on detention 
status, court geography, or respondent nationality? The picture that emerges 
is one of starkly unequal distribution of immigration representation.  
A. Detention 
One critical factor related to the possibility of obtaining counsel is 
whether the immigrant is placed in detention.118 Over the past two decades, 
immigration enforcement has become increasingly reliant on detention.119 
 
117 In interviews with nonprofit attorneys, we learned that many nonprofits rely on pro bono 
volunteers at law firms to take over their representation, particularly on meritorious asylum 
claims. The prominence of these referral relationships bears out in the data: 51% of cases with 
more than one attorney type (hybrid representation) included at least one nonprofit attorney (and 
92% of these hybrid cases included claims for relief).  
118 For an argument that due process requires appointment of counsel for detained 
immigrants, see Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in Removal 
Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113 (2008). 
119 For an overview of the astonishing expansion in immigration detention, see Jennifer M. 
Chacón, Immigration Detention: No Turning Back?, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 621 (2014); César 
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346 
(2014); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42 (2010). 
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Federal funding allows for approximately 34,000 noncitizens to be held in 
federal detention centers, jails, and prisons.120 During the study period, the 
United States government spent an estimated two billion dollars per year on 
immigration detention.121 
Many immigrants attending court proceedings are detained without a 
statutory right to release.122 For those who are eligible for release on bond 
conditions, the immigration judges may hold a custody hearing if one is 
requested by the respondent.123 When judges do rule on custody, they are 
instructed to weigh numerous factors related to risk of flight and public 
safety.124 Finally, poor immigrants often remain detained because they are 
simply unable to afford the required bond amount.125  
Fortunately, the EOIR data allow for analysis of the relationship 
between detention status and attorney representation. Each case is classified 
by one of three codes for custody status. Respondents held in custody 
throughout the pendency of their cases are categorized as “detained.” 
Respondents who were detained, but later released prior to the decision on 
the merits, are categorized as “released.” Finally, respondents who remained 
free of detention during the entire pendency of their cases are categorized 
as “never detained.” In this Article, we adopt the term “nondetained” to 
refer to released and never-detained respondents as a group. 
 
120 See Nick Miroff, Controversial Quota Drives Immigration Detention Boom, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drives-immigration-detention-boom/ 
2013/10/13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-ad1a-1a919f2ed890_story.html [http://perma.cc/5QN9-R9P4] (discussing 
a “bed mandate” that requires ICE to keep an average of 34,000 detainees in custody).  
121 H.R. REP. No. 113-91, at 40 (2013). See generally DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION 
POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A 
FORMIDABLE MACHINERY (Jan. 2013), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/enforcementpillars.pdf, [http://perma.cc/6VCR-48ML] (tracking the tremendous 
increase in federal spending on immigration enforcement). 
122 See, e.g., I.N.A. § 236(c); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012) (describing the procedure for 
detention of “criminal aliens”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B) (2015) (limiting the ability of 
immigration judges to “redetermine conditions of custody”). 
123 Immigration judges may not determine custody status on their own motion. See Matter of 
P-C-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 432, 434 (B.I.A. 1991) (“The regulations . . . only provide authority for 
the immigration judge to redetermine custody status upon application by the respondent or his 
representative.”).  
124 Bonds/Custody, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T JUST., IMMIGRATION 
JUDGE BENCHBOOK, at 6-7, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/08/15/ 
Bond_Guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/L5TA-ZKLZ] (last updated Apr. 15, 2015) [hereinafter 
IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK] (listing factors to consider in making bond 
determinations). See also In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006) (providing that 
immigration judges must weigh whether the immigrant is “a threat to national security, a danger to 
the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk”). 
125 See infra note 220 and accompanying text. 
  
32 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 1 
 
Analysis of representation by detention status reveals marked inequality. 
Across the six-year period studied, only 14% of detained respondents were 
represented, whereas 66% of the nondetained were represented. Put another 
way, nondetained respondents were almost five times more likely to obtain 
counsel than detained respondents. Figure 6 provides an even more detailed 
picture of this disparity, breaking down representation rates year-by-year for 
each of the three relevant custody statuses. 
 
Figure 6: Detained, Released, and Never-Detained Representation  
Rates for Removal Cases, 2007–2012 
 
Note: Aggregate representation rates from 2007 to 2012 are 14% for detained respondents, 69% 
for released respondents, and 65% for never-detained immigrants. 
 
In order to further analyze access to counsel from detention, we examined 
the frequency of court continuances granted to find counsel.126 Respondents 
who have not yet retained a lawyer may request additional time to find 
counsel.127 By looking at the adjournment codes for individual hearings that 
 
126 When the immigration court adjourns a hearing and schedules a new hearing for a future 
date, an “adjournment code” is entered. This adjournment code explains why the court granted the 
continuance. See Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to Deputy 
Chief Immigration Judges et al. (June 16, 2005) (obtained by authors with FOIA request #2014-
7182) [hereinafter Adjournment Code Memo] (defining the adjournment codes used in the court’s 
record keeping system). 
127 See Montes-Lopez v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1085, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that an 
immigration judge’s denial of a respondent’s motion for a continuance so that he could obtain 
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classify the reason for continuances, we were able to identify those continuances 
that were granted so the respondent could find an attorney.128 
 
Figure 7: Removal Respondents Granted a Continuance to Seek 
Representation, by Detention Status, 2007–2012 
 
Note: Percent represents proportion of removal respondents who had at least one hearing 
adjourned to seek representation during adjudication of the case. Across this time frame, 14% 
of detained, 25% of never-detained, and 41% of released respondents had at least one 
continuance to seek representation. 
 
Our analysis of these continuances to seek counsel reveals that detained 
immigrants were less likely than nondetained immigrants to be granted 
additional time to find counsel. As shown in Figure 7, only 14% of detained 
immigrants in our study were granted time to find counsel, compared to 
29% of nondetained immigrants (41% for released and 25% for never 
 
counsel violated the statutory right to counsel and necessitated reversal without a showing of 
prejudice); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2015) (“The Immigration Judge may grant a motion for 
continuance for good cause shown.”); Master Calendar Checklist for the Immigration Judge, 
IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK, supra note 124, at 3, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
eoir/legacy/2014/08/15/Script_MC_Checklist.pdf [http://perma.cc/32E5-NCJ6] (instructing immigration 
judges to ask the respondent if “he or she wishes a postponement to find an attorney”). 
128 There are two shortcomings to our reliance on EOIR’s adjournment coding. First, the 
EOIR data can only capture one adjournment code per continuance and so cannot capture if there 
are multiple contributing reasons for granting a continuance. Second, although the EOIR 
adjournment coding shows when a continuance to seek counsel is granted, it does not report when 
such a request is denied by the judge.  
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detained).129 Notably, however, the rate at which detained respondents were 
granted additional time to find counsel almost doubled during our study 
period, increasing from only 11% of detained cases in 2009 to 20% in 2012. 
Not only were detained respondents less likely than nondetained 
respondents to obtain additional time to seek counsel, they were also less 
likely to find counsel when given time to do so. Overall, only 36% of 
detained respondents seeking counsel actually found counsel, versus 71% of 
respondents who were never detained and 65% of respondents who were 
released. A detailed picture of these differences is presented in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8: Removal Respondents Granted a Continuance to Seek 
Representation that Successfully Obtained Counsel,  
by Detention Status, 2007–2012 
 
Note: Percent represents proportion of removal respondents who had at least one hearing 
adjourned to seek representation during adjudication of the case and successfully obtained 
counsel. Across this time frame, 36% of detained, 71% of never-detained, and 65% of released 
respondents obtained counsel after such adjournments. 
 
As we learned in our field research, there are many reasons why it may be 
harder for detained respondents to obtain representation.130 By definition, 
 
129 For these analyses, we included all continuances granted during the merits proceeding, as 
well as any continuances granted during any earlier nonmerits proceedings.  
130 For a thoughtful discussion of the various impediments to obtaining counsel from 
detention, see Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of 
Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1198 (2002) (discussing work by a law 
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detainees are confined in prisons, jails, and federal facilities that do not allow 
them to travel to attorney offices. They must rely on telephones in their 
facility to call attorneys, rather than visit their offices.131 Detainees are not 
able to work132 and thus face obstacles to paying for private counsel.  
These disparities in representation rates may also arise because detention 
makes it difficult for attorneys to provide representation. Many of the largest 
detention facilities are located far away from city centers, such as in Pearsall, 
Texas or Adelanto, California.133 Attorneys who provide representation often 
must travel long distances to visit their clients. Once they arrive at these 
remote locations, they must work under the constraints of facility rules, which 
involve securing clearance to enter the facility and restrictions barring laptops 
and other electronics. Attorneys we interviewed also reported long wait times 
for an available attorney–client meeting room at some detention locations. 
Finally, interviews revealed that some immigration attorneys are unwilling to 
take on detained cases, due to factors such as the added complication of 
needing to visit their clients in the detention center.134 
The challenges detainees face in finding counsel are further exacerbated 
by “rocket dockets” that have emerged in recent years to prioritize the cases 
 
school clinical program to help “brave detainees locate counsel, choose to aggressively litigate 
against the governmental agencies that hold total control over their well-being and freedom, [and] 
avoid deportation”), and Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants 
Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541 (2009) 
(presenting a case study based on New York City’s detained immigration court). 
131 Detainees are entitled to phone access to contact attorneys, although attorneys reported 
breaches of this policy in our interviews. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, 
PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 2011, at 359, http://www.ice. 
gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/pbnds2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/8DC3-4EKC] (last updated 
Feb. 2013) (“Detainees shall have reasonable and equitable access to reasonably priced telephone 
services.”). A recent class action suit brought by the ACLU of Northern California alleges that 
immigrants in detention facilities are given inadequate telephone access, which interferes with 
their due process rights to a full and fair hearing. See Complaint, Lyon v. U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, No. 3:13-cv-05878 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2013). 
132 It is true that detainees may be eligible for a “voluntary work” program in some detention 
centers, but such programs pay as little as a dollar per day. See, e.g., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENF’T, ICE/DRO RESIDENTIAL STANDARD: HOUSEKEEPING AND VOLUNTARY WORK PROGRAM 3 
(Dec. 21, 2007), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/family-residential/pdf/rs_housekeeping_voluntary_ 
work_program.pdf [http://perma.cc/5EBV-CNEU] (providing compensation of one dollar per day 
under ICE’s voluntary work program). 
133 See Detention Facilities Locator, U.S. IMMIG. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/detention-facilities [http://perma.cc/N89Q-FF8H] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) 
(providing information on each detention center). 
134 See N.Y. STUDY REPORT, supra note 11, at 15-17 (explaining that aspects of “detention 
itself undermines access to counsel,” such as detention center practices that make it difficult for 
counsel to meet with and represent their clients).  
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of detained immigrants.135 Under these programs, as interviewees described 
and we observed in our court visits, judges place detained immigrants on an 
expedited time table to complete their merits proceeding.136 In part due to 
the pressures placed on court dockets to process detained cases quickly, 
continuances granted to detainees were an average of five times shorter than 
those granted to immigrants who were never detained.137 Less time to find 
counsel may also contribute to detained immigrants’ lack of success in 
finding attorneys.  
In summary, the distribution of counsel between detained and 
nondetained cases is extremely unbalanced. During the six-year period 
studied, 86% of detained immigrants were without counsel, compared to 
only 34% of nondetained immigrants. The next Section analyzes another 
crucial dividing line for access to counsel in immigration courts: geography. 
B. Geography 
The next question we analyzed was the relationship of representation to 
the location where an immigrant’s case was decided. We find that 
representation rates vary dramatically across different court jurisdictions. In 
addition, representation rates dip sharply in rural areas and small cities, where 
the supply of practicing immigration attorneys is almost nonexistent. 
As a threshold matter, it is important to appreciate that the volume of 
removal cases decided in United States immigration courts varies 
significantly across different jurisdictions. The map in Figure 9 depicts this 
uneven distribution of removal cases. The largest circles on the map 
represent the immigration courts that decided 40,000 or more cases during 
the study period, with smaller circles representing courts with 
correspondingly fewer cases. Predictably, some cities handled a larger 
number of cases than others. During the period of our study, Miami 
 
135 In some detained courts, judges are insisting that cases on these “rocket dockets” must be 
decided in sixty days or less. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (reporting findings from an empirical study of the use of televideo technology 
in immigration court). 
136 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MANAGEMENT OF 
IMMIGRATION CASES AND APPEALS BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW 7 
tbl.1 (Oct. 2012), http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2012/e1301.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZRW6-ZSUY] 
[hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT] (citing EOIR reports on “Case Completion Goals” for 
FY 2010, which included a completion goal of sixty days for detained cases). 
137 The average length of a continuance for immigrants who obtained a continuance to find 
counsel was 24 days for detained (SD = 30); 63 days for released (SD = 79); and 119 days for never 
detained (SD = 108). This calculation is based on the number of days from the adjournment to find 
counsel to the next court date. We also find that the total time for all continuances to find counsel 
was far less for detained immigrants than for nondetained immigrants. See infra Figure 16. 
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immigration courts decided 96,201 cases, more than any other city.138 By 
comparison, judges in New Orleans decided only 4073 cases, the fewest of 
any city.  
 
Figure 9: Map of United States Removal Decisions,  
by City, 2007–2012139 
 
 
This graphic depiction also shows that many of the highest-volume 
immigration courts are located along the Southwest border and the Eastern 
coast. Only three cities—Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit—handled the 
majority of all cases adjudicated in the Midwest. Few of the over 1.2 million 
removal cases that we analyzed occurred in the Northwest. 
 
138 This total includes cases handled at two different Miami court locations, one that handles 
nondetained cases (n = 61,494) and the other that handles detained cases (n = 34,707). New York City 
detained and nondetained courts followed Miami in overall case volume, with a total of 74,618 cases. 
Los Angeles ranked third, with 68,196 cases decided during the study time period.  
139 Given their geographic location, the following base cities are not included in Figure 9: 
Hagatna, Guam; Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands; Honolulu, Hawaii; and Guaynabo, Puerto 
Rico. In addition, three United States cities with more than one immigration court “base city” 
categorization were merged (Houston, Texas; Miami, Florida; and New York City, New York). 
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Not only were immigration removal cases unevenly distributed among 
the different court jurisdictions in the United States, but each court also had 
a different rate of attorney representation. Given our earlier discussion of 
the low level of representation in detained court settings, representation 
rates are best understood by separately examining detained and nondetained 
representation rates.  
 
Figure 10a: Detained Representation Rates, by Volume of  
Detained Cases Decided, 2007–2012 
 
Note: “Total Cases” reports the total number of detained removal cases completed in that base 
city out of 668,674 detained removal cases completed between 2007 and 2012. “Percent 
Represented” reports the proportion of detained removal respondents in each category that 
had representation. The dashed vertical line is the percent of detained removal respondents 
with counsel across all cities (14%). 
 
Figure 10a lists the twenty court jurisdictions that decided the highest 
number of detained cases during the six-year period studied. Within these 
high-volume detained jurisdictions, the proportion of immigrants 
represented fluctuated by as much as twenty-two percentage points. The 
highest detained representation rate of 22% was in El Paso. The lowest—a 
shocking .002% over the entire six-year period of our study—occurred in 
Tucson, Arizona.140 We investigated further and learned that immigration 
 
140 Out of a detained removal population in Tucson of 17,053, only twenty-six respondents 
had representation. 
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judges in Tucson utilize a “quick court” in which expedited hearings are 
held in Border Patrol detention stations and judges’ chambers.141 The end 
result is the lowest representation rate in the country and lightning-fast 
processing times (97% of detained cases in Tucson were processed in one 
day).142  
 
Figure 10b: Nondetained Representation Rates, by Volume of  
Nondetained Cases Decided, 2007–2012 
 
Note: “Total Cases” reports the total number of nondetained removal cases completed in that 
base city out of 537,959 nondetained removal cases completed between 2007 and 2012. 
“Percent Represented” reports the proportion of nondetained removal respondents in each 
category that had representation. The dashed vertical line is the percent of nondetained 
removal respondents with counsel across all cities (66%). 
 
Similarly, as shown in Figure 10b, cities with the largest volumes of 
immigration cases for nondetained immigrants also varied widely in their 
 
141 See Lauren Gambino, The Busiest Border Patrol Sector, NEWS21, http://asu.news21. 
com/2010/08/the-busiest-border-patrol-sector [http://perma.cc/7R2M-9UUR] (last visited Sept. 
19, 2015) (describing the border control program in Tucson, Arizona). According to a document 
obtained by the Immigration Legal Action Center through FOIA, Tucson’s “Immigration Quick 
Court” has a target number of “noncontested deportation cases for Mexican citizens” to be heard 
each “court day.” ASSOCIATE CHIEF, OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, UNIVERSAL BORDER 
ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS 2 (Oct. 15, 2010), http://legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
Production%209_5-17-13.pdf [http://perma.cc/RE4B-PDYB]. 
142 Tucson had the highest one-day processing rate of any base city in the country during our 
study period. 
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representation rates. In the busiest twenty nondetained court jurisdictions, 
representation rates reached as high as 87% in New York City and 78% in 
San Francisco. At the low end of these twenty high-volume nondetained 
jurisdictions, only 47% of immigrants in Atlanta and Kansas City secured 
representation. Across all nondetained jurisdictions in the United States, 
66% of respondents were represented, as depicted in the dashed vertical 
line. Importantly, this nondetained representation rate is almost five times 
higher than the representation rate for detained cases.143 
We next explored the extent to which a court’s urban or rural location 
makes a difference in representation rate. Other researchers in the field 
have suggested that the location of immigration courts away from urban 
centers may place downward pressure on representation rates.144 Some have 
argued that this effect could be particularly large in the context of remote 
detention centers, given the added time and expense that urban attorneys 
incur in traveling to meet with their clients.145 Yet, to date, researchers have 
not empirically analyzed the relationship between city size, detention, and 
representation rate at a national level.  
To address this issue, we categorized all immigration court cities based 
on the city’s size.146 Cities with populations fewer than 50,000 were 
categorized as small, and those with populations between 50,000 and 
600,000 were categorized as medium. Finally, those with populations above 
600,000 were categorized as large. Overall, we found that immigrants with 
 
143 Naturally, representation rates also vary by judge. See Hausman, supra note 57 (describing 
variations in case details and results among immigration judges). However, we find that variation 
is much greater across court jurisdictions (base cities) than across the judges who sit within them. 
Specifically, in contrast to the variations depicted in Figures 10a and b, we find that representation 
rates among active judges who heard at least 1000 cases during our study period varied by only 
plus or minus four percentage points on average (SD = 4) in active detained jurisdictions and five-
and-a-half percentage points on average (SD = 3) in nondetained jurisdictions. 
144 For example, a case study of New York City immigration courts found that immigrants 
who were transferred to a different court jurisdiction were less likely to obtain counsel than those 
who remained in the urban New York court. See New York Immigrant Representation, supra note 
14, at 363 (finding that 40% of detained immigrants who remained in New York City were 
represented by counsel at the completion of their cases, as compared to 21% of those immigrants 
who were transferred outside New York City and remained detained).  
145 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED UP FAR AWAY: THE TRANSFER OF 
IMMIGRANTS TO REMOTE DETENTION CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1209webwcover.pdf [http://perma.cc/XA4M-92H6] 
(documenting difficulties faced by immigrants held in remote detention centers in securing 
representation); N.Y. STUDY REPORT, supra note 11, at 16 (stressing that, in addition to barriers to 
counsel inherent to detention centers, the fact that some detention centers are in “difficult to access 
locations” that require “added time and effort of travel” could contribute to the challenges in getting 
lawyers to take on detained cases). 
146 For a more detailed description of our city size coding method, see infra Appendix, Part A.  
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court hearings in large cities had a representation rate of 47%, more than 
four times greater than the 11% representation rate of those with hearings in 
small cities or rural locations. 
A more detailed report of our city size analysis—broken down by custody 
status—is displayed in Figure 11. Notably, both detained and nondetained 
immigrants were less likely to obtain counsel when their case was decided in a 
small city.147 Immigrants detained in small cities had the lowest 
representation rate—only 10% across all cities of fewer than 50,000 residents. 
 
Figure 11: Representation in Removal Cases, by City Size and  
Detention Status, 2007–2012 
 
Note: “Small City” includes base cities with populations up to 50,000; “Medium City” 
includes base cities with populations of 50,000 to 600,000; and “Large City” includes base 
cities with populations of 600,000 or more. 
 
The city size analysis contained in Figure 11 also reveals that detained 
cases were more likely than nondetained cases to be adjudicated in small 
cities. While 219,950 detained cases were heard in small cities, only 4476 
nondetained cases were heard in small cities. That is, the cases of vulnerable 
detainees, who we have already established are less likely to obtain 
representation, are also disproportionately concentrated in small cities. This 
 
147 This finding is statistically significant at the p < .001 level.  
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practice of locating detention centers in small cities further limits the 
detainees’ chances of obtaining counsel. 
The ongoing reality of placing detained immigration courts in remote 
areas away from counsel has recently received more attention. In 2014, 
women and children fleeing violence in Central American were brought to 
Artesia, New Mexico, a town of 11,500 people, to be detained at a 
Department of Homeland Security training facility.148 As immigration 
attorney Stephen Manning chronicles, Artesia, New Mexico, is a physical 
space “far away from public scrutiny and public access” with “[n]o lawyers, 
no human rights groups, and no community based organizations.”149 We 
checked our database of attorneys who appeared in the 1.2 million 
immigration cases in our study and found that not even one lists an address 
in Artesia, New Mexico.150 
The EOIR data allowed us to more systematically probe the relationship 
between the geographic location of courts and the supply of immigration 
attorneys. In order to conduct this analysis, we first isolated those court 
jurisdictions with at least 20,000 removals in detained or nondetained courts 
between 2007 and 2012. Of these cities, the four jurisdictions with the highest 
numbers of immigrants with representation were: New York City (62,432); 
Los Angeles (42,040); Miami (41,602); and San Francisco (19,599). Among 
cities with at least 20,000 removals, the fewest immigrants obtained 
representation in the following four cities: Florence, Arizona (1901); Tacoma, 
Washington (2385); Lumpkin, Georgia (2422); and Oakdale, Louisiana 
(2994). These eight high- and low-representation cities are listed in Table 2. 
We next analyzed the records of all individual attorneys who represented 
clients during the six-year period studied in these eight immigration courts.151 
In Table 2 we report astonishing variation in the number of immigration 
attorneys with practices located in the same city as these high-volume courts. 
Moreover, the ratio of practicing attorneys to case volume was associated with 
the number of immigrants that obtained representation. Lumpkin 
immigration court, which completed 42,006 removal cases during the study 
period, did not have a single practicing immigration attorney in the city. 
Oakdale immigration court, which completed 43,650 cases, had only four 
practicing immigration attorneys in the city. Indeed, in the four high-volume 
 
148 Ending Artesia, supra note 10, at 10. 
149 Id. at 9-10. 
150 The only immigration attorneys in New Mexico were in the cities of Albuquerque, 
Anthony, Deming, Las Cruces, Mesilla Park, Ruidoso, and Santa Fe. 
151 By pulling the identification codes, names, and address information of the attorneys that 
appeared in those courts, we were able to count the number of unique attorneys who represented 
clients in each city. For more on our methodology, see infra Appendix, Part A. 
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base cities with the fewest represented respondents, the ratio of attorneys to 
case volume ranged from zero to barely over one attorney per 1000 cases.152 In 
contrast, high-volume immigration courts with a greater volume of 
represented respondents had much higher representation ratios. New York, 
for instance, had 27.5 attorneys for every 1000 removal cases.  
 
Table 2: Attorney Availability in High-Volume Removal Courts with Highest 
and Lowest Volume of Represented Immigrants, 2007–2012 
Base City 
Attorneys in 
City 
Total Case 
Volume 
Ratio 
(per 1000 cases) 
Represented (High) 
New York 2051 74,618 27.5 
Los Angeles 1153 68,318 16.9 
San Francisco 664 36,279 18.3 
Miami 845 96,201 8.8 
Represented (Low) 
Tacoma 38 29,367 1.3 
Florence 19 20,766 0.9 
Oakdale 4 43,650 0.1 
Lumpkin 0 42,006 0.0 
Note: “Attorneys in City” represents the number of immigration attorney representatives in 
each base city. “Total Case Volume” represents the number of removal cases completed in the 
base city. “Ratio” represents the number of attorneys in the base city per 1000 cases. 
 
This research underscores the decisive role that geography plays in 
accessing legal counsel. Removal cases are highly concentrated in those 
immigration courts located along the Southwest border and the East coast. 
Yet representation rates in these high-volume courts vary widely, even when 
we controlled for detention status. Geography is a particularly harsh barrier 
to accessing counsel for those immigrants attending court in small cities and 
rural areas where few immigration attorneys practice. The placement of 
approximately one-third of detained cases in these remote court locations 
has only further intensified the obstacles faced by detained immigrants in 
accessing counsel. 
 
152 Researchers of civil legal assistance programs have similarly found that the availability of 
attorneys and pro bono services varies widely across geographic regions. For example, as of 2010, 
Louisiana only had 1.5% of the total number of active lawyers in the United States, as compared to the 
13.3% located in New York. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, ACCESS ACROSS 
AMERICA: FIRST REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING PROJECT 67, 96 
(Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/access_across_america_ 
first_report_of_the_civil_justice_infrastructure_mapping_project.pdf [http://perma.cc/BEN9-XRHX]. 
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C. Nationality 
The final aspect of inequality in immigration court representation that 
we evaluated is nationality. Previous studies have found that immigrants 
from certain countries or geographic regions have a higher likelihood of 
receiving relief from removal.153 Yet no study has examined disparities in 
retaining counsel by nationality.154 To explore this question, we identified 
the fifteen most common respondent countries of origin alleged in United 
States removal cases. Then, we determined the percent of immigrants 
represented by counsel in each of these nationality groups. 
The compelling results of our nationality analysis are displayed in 
Figure 12. Although Mexicans were by far the largest nationality group in 
removal, they were also the least likely to be represented by counsel. Only 
21% of the 574,448 Mexicans who were put in removal proceedings had an 
attorney. In sharp comparison, the 40,397 Chinese placed in removal 
proceedings were represented in 92% of the cases.  
 
 
153 See, e.g., GAO ASYLUM REPORT, supra note 58, at 80-82 & 81 tbl.10 (finding sizable differences 
in asylum grant rates based on applicant nationality for both affirmative and defensive claims). 
154 Federal immigration law has a long history of giving preference to certain immigrant 
groups and in discriminating along lines of race. See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA, 
AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2006) (analyzing the history of immigration law and policy in the United 
States). In particular, Mexicans as a group have been disproportionately criminalized and targeted 
for deportation throughout United States history. See generally Nicholas De Genova, The Legal 
Production of Mexican/Migrant “Illegality” (detailing the severe restrictions the United States has 
placed on legal migration from Mexico), in GOVERNING IMMIGRATION THROUGH CRIME: A 
READER 160 (Julie A. Dowling & Jonathan Xavier Inda eds., 2013); Gerald P. López, 
Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 
615 (1981) (outlining the history of deportation of Mexican nationals from the United States). 
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Figure 12: Representation Rates Among Nationalities with Greatest  
Number of Cases Decided, 2007–2012 
 
This 71% spread in representation rates across nationalities could be 
attributed to a number of factors. Economic status certainly plays a role, as 
the scarcity of pro bono resources demands that the majority of immigrants 
who obtain representation must be able to afford an attorney. The ability to 
find an attorney could also be influenced by the strength of the social 
networks of the different immigrant groups.155 This variation could also stem 
from differences in the value placed on formal legal representation as well as 
informal connections some immigrants may have to assistance short of actual 
representation, such as from paralegals and “notarios.”156 Finally, immigration 
law may help explain why certain nationalities are less likely to retain 
attorneys, given that remedies such as asylum rely on country conditions.157 
 
155 Since the time of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the Chinese have had a history of 
high rates of legal representation in immigration courts, in part due to very tight social networks 
and extensive contacts with attorneys. See LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: 
CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 37-68 (1995) 
(describing how Chinese social networks developed to combat harsh immigration policies). 
156 See ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ ET AL., LIVES IN THE BALANCE: ASYLUM 
ADJUDICATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 54-60 (2014) (discussing 
the importance of community ties in obtaining representation in seeking asylum); Khalid Koser, 
Social Networks and the Asylum Cycle: The Case of Iranians in the Netherlands, 31 INT’L MIGRATION 
REV. 591, 602-03 (1997) (analyzing the role of social networks in providing assistance to recently 
arrived migrants). 
157 Thank you to Professor Rebecca Sharpless for raising this point with us. 
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Figure 13: Detention Rates Among Nationalities with Greatest  
Number of Cases Decided, 2007–2012 
 
As seen in Figure 13, we also find a troubling spread in detention rates 
by nationality. While Figure 13 is not a perfect inverse of the representation 
rates displayed in Figure 12, it does come fairly close. Chinese, who had the 
highest representation rate of any nationality group (92%), were detained at 
a rate of only 4%, the lowest of any major nationality group. In contrast, 
Mexicans, who had the lowest representation rate of any nationality group 
(21%), were subject to detention 78% of the time. These findings raise 
compelling questions as to whether Mexicans and other Latinos are 
disproportionately targeted for immigration detention.158 Research into 
other aspects of immigration enforcement has shown that the availability of 
detention and deportation can incentivize law enforcement to engage in 
racial profiling of the Latino community.159 
 
158 See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 103 
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 114-15), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2501704 
[http://perma.cc/J6XJ-JBNQ] (documenting the “racially skewed enforcement” of immigration 
and criminal laws against Mexicans and other Latinos that “threaten[s] to delegitimize 
immigration law”); Yolanda Vázquez, Constructing Crimmigration: Latino Subordination in a “Post-
Racial” World, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 599 (2015) (arguing that the detention of Latinos has 
“resulted in the devastation of Latinos, their families, their communities, and the countries of their 
origin, thereby contributing to their inability to gain economic and political stability”).  
159 See, e.g., TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING 
IN THE ICE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM (Sept. 2009), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/ 
files/policybrief_irving_0909_v9.pdf [http://perma.cc/YGK5-SVWJ] (documenting a correlation 
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Up to this point we have shown that 63% of immigrants facing 
deportation went without representation during our study period. As Part 
II explained, there are stark inequalities in how this limited amount of 
representation was distributed. Immigrants held in detention or scheduled 
for hearings in rural areas and small cities were the least likely to find an 
attorney. Additionally, the likelihood of securing representation varied 
markedly based on the respondent’s nationality. Next, in Part III, we turn to 
the central question of whether and how representation matters. 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION 
AND IMMIGRATION OUTCOMES 
 Up to this point, this Article has established that the overwhelming 
majority of immigrants are forced to defend themselves during removal 
proceedings. Parts I and II have also revealed stark differences in court 
location, nationality, and custody status correlating with whether counsel is 
accessed in United States immigration courts. Yet to what extent does 
representation make a difference in deportation cases?  
Advocates supporting expanded access to counsel for immigrants have 
relied on two main assumptions about the difference that representation 
makes. The first is that immigrants are less likely to be deported when they 
are represented. The second is that cases with representation move more 
swiftly through the system, thereby improving court and detention 
efficiencies by resolving cases more quickly.160 No research has yet measured 
the strength of these assumptions on a national scale.  
 
between immigration enforcement in a local jail and the profiling of Latinos in Irving, Texas); 
Ashar, supra note 130, at 1192-99 (describing an increase in race-based immigration enforcement that 
relies on immigration detention); Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the War on Drugs Meets the 
Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 967, 968-
69 (2015) (arguing that the “group of noncitizens subject to removal tends to be racially skewed” and 
this effect is exacerbated by “the racially disparate impacts of the criminal justice system”).  
160 Some interesting research has also begun to explore how detention and deportation are 
associated with other social costs. See, e.g., THE CENTER FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY ET AL., THE 
NEW YORK IMMIGRANT FAMILY UNITY PROJECT: GOOD FOR FAMILIES, GOOD FOR 
EMPLOYERS, AND GOOD FOR ALL NEW YORKERS 6-14 (2013), http://populardemocracy.org/ 
sites/default/files/immgrant_family_unity_project_print_layout.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q2D2-UK47] 
(documenting the cost of foster care and health services for children whose caregivers are detained or 
deported); REPRESENTATION IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, supra note 14, at 13 (noting that 
detention and deportation “deeply damage[s] familial relationships”); N.Y. STUDY REPORT, supra 
note 11, at 14 (arguing that children who are separated from their detained parents are more likely to 
experience psychological problems); Montgomery, supra note 17, at 23 exhibit 8 (calculating the cost of 
foster care in cases where United States citizen children are separated from their deported parents). 
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A. Efficacy 
This Section turns to the central question of whether and how attorney 
representation matters for immigrants facing deportation. Two caveats are 
in order. First, the analysis presented here is descriptive, based on an 
analysis of case files. While we do show robust, statistically significant 
correlations between representation and certain outcomes, we do not argue 
that representation causes the respondent success and efficiency gains that 
we describe. For example, the higher success rates for relief applications 
that we identify in represented cases may be due to selection effects: 
attorneys may choose cases they can win.161 Cases with weak facts or harsh 
law could be rejected and left unrepresented. Even attorneys offering free 
legal services through a nonprofit organization or pro bono initiative may 
want to be strategic and focus resources on the strongest or most 
sympathetic claims. In addition, clients themselves may self-select: those 
with the strongest desire to fight their cases may be precisely those who 
succeed in finding attorneys.162 In the future, a controlled study in which 
immigrants are randomly assigned to counsel or self-representation would 
allow researchers to address some of these issues of selection bias.163  
Second, our analysis of the relationship between counsel and case 
outcomes does not purport to measure the experience164 or zealousness165 of 
the individual attorneys handling these cases. The low quality of 
 
161 See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette (pointing out issues of selection bias in 
analyzing asylum claims), in REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION 
AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM, supra note 12, at 45, 75 n.33. 
162 For additional discussion of issues of selection bias, see Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 
44, at 2196-98 (arguing that scholars should turn their attention away from case-file based studies 
of attorney representation and instead conduct randomized studies of attorney representation).  
163 Cf. D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in 
a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 934 (2013) 
[hereinafter The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance] (concluding in a randomized study of eviction 
defendants that those offered legal services by Greater Boston Legal Services fared far better than 
those not offered help). 
164 See Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study on the 
Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 433, 454 (1992) (reporting that out of 149 observed asylum hearings, every 
successful claimant was represented by “experienced counsel”). 
165 For a persuasive argument that more attention should be paid to providing zealous 
representation in immigration court, see Elizabeth Keyes, Zealous Advocacy: Pushing Against the 
Borders in Immigration Litigation, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 475 (2015) (arguing that higher 
standards should be set for counsel appearing in immigration court), and Andrew I. Schoenholtz 
& Hamutal Bernstein, Improving Immigration Adjudications Through Competent Counsel, 21 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 55 (2008) (noting the potential for increased success rates if noncitizens were 
represented by competent counsel). 
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immigration lawyering is a topic of significant concern.166 A study of 
immigration judges in New York found that a shocking 33% of immigration 
lawyers were “inadequate” and 14% were “grossly inadequate.”167 Appellate 
courts have notoriously criticized the “lack-luster” skills of many 
immigration attorneys who practice in deportation courts.168 Nonetheless, 
although we do not attempt to quantify attorney skill or strategic 
decisionmaking, our project is the first on immigration representation to 
systematically analyze case outcomes at each stage of the removal process 
and in relation to the organizational type of the attorneys involved.169  
1. Seeking and Obtaining Relief 
Success in the immigration system is generally understood as the ability to 
remain in the United States, achieved when the government’s charges are 
terminated (e.g., when the Notice of Action fails to state a valid reason for 
removal) or when an immigration judge grants relief from removal (e.g., 
asylum). Using termination and relief as a combined measurement of success, 
we find that both detained and nondetained immigrants with counsel had 
higher success rates. These higher rates are displayed in Figure 14.  
Depending on custody status, representation was associated with a 
nineteen to forty-three percentage point boost in rate of case success. Put 
another way, detained respondents, when compared to their pro se 
counterparts, were ten-and-a-half times more likely to succeed, released 
respondents were five-and-a-half times more likely to succeed, and never-
detained respondents were three-and-a-half times more likely to succeed.  
 
 
166 See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Practicing Immigration Law in Filene’s Basement, 84 N.C. L. REV. 
1449, 1477, 1482 (2006) (describing one solo immigration lawyer as “taking far too many cases” and 
“abandoning clients, ignoring filing deadlines, and missing hearings”). 
167 New York Immigrant Representation, supra note 14, at 391. 
168 See, e.g., Bouras v. Holder, 779 F.3d 665, 681 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, opinion 
vacated, No. 14-2179 (7th Cir. July 14, 2015) (No. 41) (“There are some first-rate immigration 
lawyers, especially at law schools that have clinical programs in immigration law, but on the whole 
the bar that defends immigrants in deportation proceedings . . . is weak—inevitably, because most 
such immigrants are impecunious and there is no government funding for their lawyers.”). 
169 For an important example of a recent study that compared case results based on attorney 
type—namely, public defenders versus court-appointed private attorneys—see James M. Anderson 
& Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder 
Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154 (2012). 
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Figure 14: Successful Case Outcomes (Termination or Relief) in Removal 
Cases, by Detention and Representation Status, 2007–2012170 
 
These findings suggest that having an attorney to help navigate the 
complex removal process enhances the chance of success in removal. They 
could also reflect other factors, such as the reality that prevailing on a pro se 
claim from detention is almost impossible and that attorneys tend to 
gravitate toward claims that they can win. Moreover, respondents cannot 
obtain relief unless they apply for it and, as we presented earlier, cases with 
representation and those litigated outside detention are far more likely to 
pursue relief.171 In order to further evaluate these patterns, we next explore 
the two components of obtaining relief—the respondent’s decision to apply 
for relief, followed by the judge’s decision to grant the application.  
 
 
170 All differences between pro se and represented respondents are statistically significant  
(p < .001, two-tailed difference of proportions test). 
171 See supra Table 1 and infra Table 3. As Juliet Stumpf has eloquently pointed out, mass 
immigration detention now “drives deportation” and risks “erroneous” decisions in immigration 
courts. Juliet P. Stumpf, Civil Detention and Other Oxymorons, 40 QUEEN’S L.J. 55 (2014). 
  
2015] A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court 51 
 
Figure 15: Relief Application and Grants of Relief in Removal Cases,  
by Detention and Representation Status, 2007–2012 
 
Note: This figure considers only respondents whose cases were not terminated. 
 
These findings have implications for a national public defender system. 
Although our data are merely descriptive and cannot predict what 
representation for all respondents would look like, these results suggest that 
universal representation would provide respondents with more avenues for 
relief. In addition, it may help to deter unmeritorious applications from 
being filed by pro se respondents. As Professor Philip Schrag has argued in 
the context of asylum, allowing the government to fund counsel would both 
“be fair to low-income asylum applicants with complex but valid cases” and 
“help to deter fraudulent applicants from pressing their claims.”172 
We know that attorneys are associated with success in immigration cases, 
but do some types of attorneys have more success than others? The quality 
of the immigration bar is often criticized as substandard,173 yet few studies 
have addressed the relationship between attorney type and case outcome. In 
a 2011 survey, New York City immigration judges rated pro bono counsel, 
 
172 Philip G. Schrag, Offer Free Legal Counseling to Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/07/12/how-can-the-asylum-system-be-fixed/offer-fr 
ee-legal-counseling-to-asylum-seekers [http://perma.cc/VZP5-P29L]. 
173 See Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal 
Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330 (2011) (reporting that federal judges gave immigration 
attorneys the lowest ranking for quality of any attorney type). 
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law school clinics, and nonprofits as more highly skilled than private 
attorneys.174 A recent report concluded that 83% of cases handled by 
nonprofit organizations in Northern California had a successful outcome.175  
Other empirical work in this area has focused on asylum cases. One 
study found that asylum seekers represented by Georgetown University’s 
clinical program were granted asylum in 89% of cases, compared to only 
46% of the time in asylum cases handled by other types of attorneys.176 
More recently, researchers analyzed asylum claims filed by 1234 immigration 
attorneys.177 Among other findings, they concluded that pro bono attorneys 
“are better than more experienced immigration attorneys” in terms of their 
win rate on asylum cases.178  
Our attorney-type analysis builds on these earlier findings, using a more 
robust data sample that includes all types of claims for relief. Importantly, 
our analysis is also staged: we first examine the rate of case terminations 
and, among those cases that are not terminated, look at relief rates among 
those who seek relief. This type of analysis is critical to properly 
understanding what happens as respondents move through the removal 
process.179 Finally, we also separate grant rates based on three different 
custody statuses: detained, released, and never detained. 
The results of our analysis are contained in Table 3. We find that small 
and solo firms had the worst overall performance. Across each custody 
status, small and solo firms had the lowest level of success attaining case 
termination and relief for their clients. They were more or less on par with 
other providers, however, in terms of the rate with which they sought relief. 
 
  
 
174 New York Immigrant Representation, supra note 14, at 393 tbl.9. 
175 See REPRESENTATION IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, supra note 14, at 25 (defining 
successful outcome as termination or relief). The study’s authors do not specify if this statistic 
includes clients who did not apply for relief. 
176 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 15, at 341 fig.29. 
177 Banks Miller et al., Leveling the Odds: The Effect of Quality Legal Representation in Cases of 
Asymmetrical Capability, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 209, 221 (2015). 
178 Id. at 227. As discussed earlier, nonprofit organizations play a central role in screening, 
referral, and mentoring of pro bono volunteers from law firms. See supra note 115. 
179 For a critique of observational studies that misleadingly examine “only cases that reach 
some kind of hearing” and exclude all cases that are resolved in other ways (such as through 
settlement or dismissal), see Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 44, at 2185. 
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Table 3: Case Outcomes, by Attorney Type and  
Custody Status, 2007–2012 
Nonprofits enjoyed high levels of success in detained cases (7% of 
detained cases were terminated, and 59% of detained cases with relief 
applications were granted). However, for detained cases, large firms, which 
primarily handled cases through pro bono programs, had the highest win 
rates of any category of attorney (11% of detained cases were terminated, 
and 64% of detained cases with relief applications were granted). As Table 3 
reveals, nonprofits also did quite well in obtaining termination for released 
and never-detained clients, but were less competitive in obtaining relief 
than large firms, medium firms, and law school clinics. 
 Percent
 Case
Termination 
Relief 
Application 
Relief 
If Apply 
Detained
Small Firm 7 39 47 
Medium Firm 7 41 58 
Large Firm 11 68 64 
Nonprofit 7 35 59 
Law School Clinic 10 45 56 
Hybrid 7 64 54 
Pro Se 1 3 23 
Released  
Small Firm 15 61 47 
Medium Firm 17 64 60 
Large Firm 25 72 71 
Nonprofit 31 61 59 
Law School Clinic 36 72 72 
Hybrid 24 75 59 
Pro Se 5 10 14 
Never Detained  
Small Firm 18 82 63 
Medium Firm 17 85 76 
Large Firm 20 88 77 
Nonprofit 31 74 70 
Law School Clinic 41 83 77 
Hybrid 26 83 68 
Pro Se 15 15 13 
Note: “Case Termination” signifies percent of cases terminated in each category. “Relief 
Application” signifies percent of nonterminated cases that applied for relief in each category. 
“Relief if Apply” signifies percent of relief applications granted relief in each category.  
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Law school clinical programs had the highest overall success rate of any 
attorney type for relief applications on behalf of nondetained clients. For 
clients released from detention, law clinics obtained termination in 36% of 
their cases and won relief in 72% of the cases where they sought relief. For 
clients who were never detained, law clinics obtained termination in 41% of 
their cases and won relief in 77% of the cases where they sought relief.  
Finally, for comparison purposes, the last row in Table 3 displays the 
patterns in termination, relief applications, and grants of relief for pro se 
respondents. The contrast between pro se respondents and represented 
respondents is remarkable. While other research has compared pro se and 
represented outcomes among certain groups of applications for relief (such 
as asylum),180 our work shows that the procedural paths of pro se and 
represented cases are different. At the initial stage of the removal process, 
pro se cases were much more likely to have their charges sustained. Then, 
after having these charges sustained, they were far less likely to pursue 
relief. For instance, among detained pro se respondents, 99% had their 
charges sustained and 97% never sought relief from removal.  
2. Regression Analysis of the Relationship Between  
Representation and Case Outcomes 
To further distill the impact of attorney representation on case outcomes, in 
this subsection we turn to a sequential logit regression model,181 which allows us 
to take into account the two-staged procedure in immigration cases and to 
control for various respondent- and case-level attributes.182 As in Parts I and II, 
we limited our data sample to the approximately 1.2 million removal cases 
 
180 For example, a recent study looks only at asylum claims in concluding that it would be 
“actually better” for immigrants with low-quality attorneys to represent themselves. Miller et al., 
supra note 177, at 210. However, the study only analyzes those cases in which respondents sought one 
type of relief (asylum) and ignores other types of claims as well as the crucial earlier stages in the 
procedural process where termination is granted and applications for relief are filed. Our research 
reveals just how rare it is that a pro se respondent files for asylum. In our National Sample, only 
3.7% of pro se respondents sought asylum in the second stage of removal. See supra Table 1. 
181 For additional description of this analysis, see supra Figure 4 and Sections I.B, C.  
182 Other studies have similarly used a logistic regression to analyze the relationship between 
counsel and case outcomes. See, e.g., GAO ASYLUM REPORT, supra note 58, at 30 
(“Representation generally doubled the likelihood of affirmative and defensive cases being granted 
asylum, after we controlled for the effects of the immigration court the case was heard in; the 
applicant’s nationality . . . .”); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 15, at 340 (“The regression analyses 
confirmed that, with all other variables in the study held constant, represented asylum seekers 
were substantially more likely to win their case than those without representation.”); Emily Ryo, 
Detained: A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings, 50 LAW & SOC’Y REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2016) (on 
file with author) (“[T]he odds of being granted bond are more than 3.5 times as high for detainees 
with attorneys than those who appeared pro se.”). 
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decided on their merits by immigration law judges between 2007 and 2012. To 
enhance the analysis, we removed all cases of children, as well as cases of 
immigrant prisoners decided in the IHP.183 Our regression analysis also 
controlled for a number of other factors that could be associated with obtaining 
counsel: (1) detention status; (2) nationality; and (3) prosecutorial charge 
type.184 We also included fixed effects for the court jurisdiction (“base city”) 
and fiscal year in which the case was decided.185  
The results of our regression are displayed in Table 4. Each column 
presents a different binary outcome category (e.g., obtaining counsel or 
not). Our results are reported in terms of odds ratios. If the odds ratio is 
higher than 1, it reveals an increase in the odds of each outcome category, 
while controlling for other variables.  
We first analyzed the likelihood of obtaining counsel. The first column of 
Table 4, “Received Counsel,” explores differential odds of obtaining counsel for 
different categories of respondents. For example, the first row in that column 
reveals that the odds that nondetained respondents obtained counsel were 
almost nine times higher than similarly situated detained respondents.  
 
 
183 See infra Appendix, Part C. 
184 The coding of these variables is discussed further in the Appendix, Part A. 
185 Including fixed effects for court jurisdiction (“base city”) and year of decision helps 
account for unmeasured factors that might lead to lower or higher grant rates in different courts or 
across different years.  
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Table 4: Logit Regressions of the Effect of Representation in  
Removal Cases, 2007–2012 
 Received
Counsel 
Case 
Termination 
Relief 
 Applicationa Grantb 
Counsel — 1.79*** 15.03*** 5.49*** 
  (0.02) (0.11) (0.09) 
Nondetained 8.58*** 7.62*** 4.19*** 2.17*** 
 (0.06) (0.12) (0.05) (0.04) 
Regionc      
Central America 0.95*** 1.06*** 1.78*** 0.63*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
South America 2.00*** 1.16*** 1.33*** 0.85*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Caribbean .68*** 2.58*** 2.39*** 0.93*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Asia 2.73*** 0.86*** 3.93*** 0.8*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
Other 2.4*** 1.34*** 3.73*** 1.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
Charged     
Other Criminal 0.98 0.79*** 1.79*** 4.42*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.12) 
EWIe 0.36*** 0.29*** 0.49*** 0.99 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Other Immigration 0.47*** 0.87*** 0.61*** 1.57*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.31 0.24 0.50 0.15 
No. of observations 1,142,842 1,142,842 1,042,174 262,704 
Note: Logit results presented in Table 4 are reported as odds ratios, with standard errors 
reported in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p <0 .01, *** p < 0.001. Estimates for fixed effects for base 
city and year are not reported in order to conserve space. “Pseudo R-squared” provides a 
measure of goodness of fit of the statistical model. 
a. “Relief Application” is among nonterminated cases that included at least one application for 
relief (with or without an application for Voluntary Departure), with the base category 
including cases with no application or application for Voluntary Departure only.  
b. “Relief Grant” is among cases that included an application for relief.  
c. Mexico is the base category for “Region.” 
d. Aggravated felony is the base category for “Charge.”  
e. “EWI” stands for Entry Without Inspection. 
 
Next, we examined (in columns two through four) the relationship of 
counsel to three key stages in the immigration removal process. The second 
column of Table 4, “Case Termination,” indicates whether the immigrant’s 
case was terminated. The third column, “Relief Application,” analyzes 
whether the immigrant applied for relief, and the fourth, “Relief Grant,” 
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indicates whether the immigrant’s application for relief was granted. The 
results of this regression reported in the first row, “Counsel,” reveal that 
removal respondents were significantly more likely to obtain successful 
outcomes when represented by counsel. Specifically, after controlling for all 
of the factors just described (detention status, region of nationality, charge, 
year, and base city), the odds were fifteen times greater that immigrants 
with representation, as compared to those without, sought relief, five-and-a-
half times greater that they obtained relief from removal, and almost two 
times greater that they had their case terminated.186 
Because custody status was correlated with both representation and case 
outcomes of interest,187 we also assessed the impact of counsel for detained and 
nondetained respondents in separate regressions. The results of these analyses 
are displayed in Table 5. The row titled “Counsel” displays the odds ratio 
results first for detained respondents and second for nondetained respondents. 
Among similarly situated detained immigrants, the odds were almost eleven 
times greater that those with counsel (as compared to those without) sought 
relief, three times greater that they successfully obtained relief, and a little over 
four times greater that they had their case terminated. In addition, among 
similarly situated nondetained immigrants, the odds were sixteen-and-a-half 
times greater that those with counsel (as compared to those without) sought 
relief, eight times greater that they successfully obtained relief, and one-and-a-
half times greater that they had their case terminated. 
In short, at every stage in immigration court proceedings, representation 
was associated with dramatically more successful case outcomes for 
immigrant respondents. Moreover, this finding was robust. The significance 
of immigration representation persisted when we examined all removal 
cases together, as well as when we looked at detained and nondetained  
cases separately. 
 
 
186 We also assessed the extent to which correlation among respondents before the same 
judge impacted the significance of our results by running the same regressions with standard 
errors clustered by judge (not presented). We found no influence on the magnitude or the 
significance of our key variables for case outcomes. We therefore report analyses using our full 
sample without clustered standard errors. 
187 See supra Figures 6 & 14. 
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Table 5: Logit Regressions of the Effect of Representation in Detained and 
Nondetained Cases, 2007–2012 
Detained Nondetained 
Case 
Term.a 
Relief Case 
Term.a, d 
Relief 
Appl. b Grantc Appl. b Grantc, e 
Counsel 4.13*** 10.64*** 2.97*** 1.52*** 16.48*** 8.01*** 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.08) (0.01) (0.16) (0.17) 
Region
f
       
Central America  1.18*** 2.16*** 0.47*** 0.98 1.58*** 0.61*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
       
South America 1.30*** 1.64*** 0.83** 1.10*** 1.23*** 0.84*** 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Caribbean 1.60*** 3.47*** 0.84*** 2.59*** 1.99*** 0.93** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Asia 1.60*** 3.44*** 0.82*** 0.79*** 3.88*** 0.77*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
Other 1.96*** 4.95*** 1.24*** 1.23*** 3.40*** 1.08*** 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
Charge
g
       
Other Criminal 0.94* 2.07*** 5.47*** 0.86*** 1.16** 2.05*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.18) (0.03) (0.05) (0.11) 
EWIh 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.68*** 0.39*** 0.81*** 0.54*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Other Immigration 0.64*** 0.90*** 2.55*** 1.15*** 0.84*** 0.82*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.15 0.38 0.2 0.11 0.34 0.14 
No. of observations 631,925 621,584 42,335 510,913 420,590 220,331 
Note: Logit results presented in Table 5 are reported as odds ratios, with standard errors reported 
below in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p <0 .01, *** p < 0.001. Estimates for fixed effects for base city and 
year are not reported to conserve space. “Pseudo R-Squared” provides a measure of goodness of fit of 
the statistical model.  
a. “Case Term.” stands for case termination.  
b. “Relief Appl.” is among nonterminated cases that included at least one application for relief (with 
or without an application for Voluntary Departure), with the base category including cases with no 
application or application for Voluntary Departure only.  
c. “Relief Grant” is among cases that included an application for relief.  
d. A total of thirty-eight observations were dropped from the analysis because the base city fixed 
effect predicted failure perfectly and could not be analyzed. 
e. A total of four observations were dropped from the analysis because the base city fixed effect 
predicted failure perfectly and could not be analyzed. 
f. Mexico is the base category for “Region.” 
g. Aggravated felony is the base category for “Charge.”  
h. “EWI” stands for Entry Without Inspection. 
 
The next Section turns to a less-tested aspect of the emerging debate 
over access to counsel in immigration proceedings: the extent to which 
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appointing counsel would promote court efficiencies. In other words, could 
providing appointed counsel for immigrants in removal cases actually pay 
for itself by reducing the duration of court adjudication? 
B. Efficiency 
The idea that legal representation will speed up court proceedings has 
gained a foothold in the immigration field.188 Immigration judges surveyed 
in 2011 almost unanimously agreed that they can adjudicate cases “more 
efficiently and quickly” when the respondent “has a competent lawyer.”189 A 
recent study conducted by NERA Economic Consulting at the request of 
the New York Bar Association concluded that providing appointed counsel 
for immigrants in removal cases could actually pay for itself.190 Key 
assumptions in this analysis are that “cases with lawyers involved will 
proceed more quickly from initiation of the cases to decisions by 
immigration judges” and that “respondents with lawyers would be more 
likely to secure release at the outset of removal proceedings through a 
successful bond hearing.”191 More recently, in establishing a new legal 
services program for immigrant children, Congress instructed EOIR to 
explore how providing free lawyers might improve the efficiency of court 
proceedings and save courts money.192  
Despite such speculation by policymakers, advocates, and scholars that 
providing representation accelerates court dockets, there is little empirical 
analysis of such theories. Research on the Department of Justice’s Legal 
Orientation Program, which provides know-your-rights trainings to 
unrepresented litigants in detention, has demonstrated that the merits 
proceedings of detained immigrants were completed more quickly when 
respondents attended an educational orientation prior to coming to court.193 
 
188 Margaret Taylor has cautioned against the growing embrace of efficiency rationales for 
promoting legal services for detained immigrants. See Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal 
Representation For Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647, 1709 
(1997) (“It is, in the end, a risky strategy to build support for increased legal representation at INS 
detention facilities around the promise that detained aliens will be processed more efficiently.”). 
189 BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 27, at 56. 
190 See Montgomery, supra note 17, at 35 (“I estimate that providing counsel for detainees 
would more than pay for itself in terms of fiscal cost savings.”). 
191 Id. at 5 (hypothesizing that cases will move more quickly “either due to fewer 
continuances, or because a substantial number of detained respondents without any chance of 
relief will accept deportation more quickly if well-counseled”). 
192 See H.R. REP. No. 113-171, at 38 (2013) (“The Committee encourages EOIR, within the 
funding provided, to explore ways to better serve vulnerable populations such as children and 
improve court efficiency through pilot efforts aimed at improving their legal representation.”).  
193 VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 49 fig.9. 
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Yet no research has focused on the relationship between attorney 
representation and court adjudication times. This Section draws on six years 
of removal cases to address this question. Specifically, we focus on four key 
aspects of court efficiency and representation by counsel: (1) court 
continuances to find counsel; (2) litigation patterns in represented cases; (3) 
release from detention; and (4) failures to appear in court. 
1. Court Continuances to Find Counsel 
As mentioned in Part I of this Article, immigration judges are required 
to advise respondents of their right to be represented by counsel of their 
own choosing.194 If the respondent is not represented by counsel at the 
initial hearing, he or she may request additional time to find counsel. We 
documented in Part I that 14% of detained respondents, 41% of released 
respondents, and 25% of never-detained respondents obtained at least one 
continuance to find counsel.195  
Time spent seeking counsel is especially costly for detained cases, where the 
government is expending money to house the respondents. The estimated cost 
to detain an immigrant for day is $158.196 Moreover, as we demonstrated earlier 
in this Article, the majority of detained immigrants who took additional time to 
seek counsel were not successful in securing representation.197  
The left side of Figure 16 shows how much time these continuances to 
find counsel consumed over the life of those removal cases in which they 
were granted. For detained respondents who were granted continuances to 
find counsel, an average of 33 days was spent seeking counsel; for released 
respondents an average of 98 days; and for those who were never detained 
an average of 158 days.  
 
 
194 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
195 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
196 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-26, ALTERNATIVES TO 
DETENTION: IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS 
PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS 18-19 (Nov. 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666911.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/4HRK-X3J7]. For discussion of the social costs associated with detention, see 
supra note 160.  
197 See supra Figure 8. 
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Figure 16: Court Time Spent in Search for Counsel,  
by Custody Status, 2007–2012198 
 
Note: “Time Seeking Counsel” includes median (hollow symbol) and average (solid symbol) 
number of days between hearings adjourned to seek counsel and the subsequent hearing, 
among those who had at least one hearing adjourned to seek counsel. “Percent of Total Case 
Duration Seeking Counsel” is the median (hollow symbol) and average (solid symbol) 
proportion of the entire case that was spent seeking counsel. Confidence intervals for mean 
days and mean percent too narrow to present. 
 
Although not all cases involved such continuances, for those that did, the 
amount of time spent looking for an attorney was a significant portion of the 
total case duration. As shown on the right side of Figure 16, on average the 
amount of time spent seeking counsel was slightly more than half (50.4%) of 
the total adjudication time for detained cases, 25% for released cases, and 42% 
for never-detained cases.199 
The findings of significant court days spent in search of counsel are 
relevant to the establishment of a national public defender system. In such a 
system, counsel could meet with their clients before the first court hearing. 
Instead of coming to court only to ask for time to seek counsel, immigrants 
 
198 To understand the methodology underlying Figure 16 and other measurements of case 
duration in this Article, see infra Appendix, Part C.  
199 In the Case Duration Sample, the average total case duration for cases with continuances 
to find counsel was 125 days (SD = 242) for detained, 611 days (SD = 577) for released, and 676 days 
(SD = 638) for never detained. See infra Appendix, Part C. 
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could be prepared at the time of their first hearing to tell the judge how 
they plan to proceed in the case.200  
Thus, earlier evaluation of the cases would allow key decisions about 
whether to agree to deportation (or, alternatively, to seek relief) to be made 
sooner. For detained (or formerly detained) cases, appointing counsel would 
reap cost savings associated with not having to pay to detain immigrants 
while they search, often unsuccessfully, for counsel.201 For those immigrants 
who are never subject to detention, appointed counsel could still assist with 
improving court efficiency by reducing the number of court hearings 
required to continue the case so that the immigrant can find counsel and 
decide whether to pursue relief. We now address these efficiency issues in 
more detail by looking closely at litigation patterns in cases with counsel. 
2. Litigation Patterns in Represented Cases 
In order to be relevant to the potential establishment of a public 
defender system for immigration, our efficiency analysis must also take into 
account the fact that cases with attorneys took longer on average than pro se 
cases.202 In addition to the delays in finding counsel discussed in the 
previous subsection, this subsection advances three additional factors that 
are associated with these longer case times: (1) delays in attorney entrance 
into represented cases; (2) the concentration of meritorious claims for relief 
in represented cases; and (3) regional variation in case duration. 
Furthermore, this subsection looks more closely at the cases that take up the 
most time (those with claims for relief) and documents ways in which pro se 
respondents may waste court resources, including by filing more claims that 
rarely succeed and by not taking time to prepare for trial. 
 
200 The New York Immigrant Family Unity Project, see supra note 9, operates on such a 
model, informing the judge as early as the first court appearance if a client is “prepared to be 
deported.” Kirk Semple, New Help for Poor Immigrants Who Are in Custody and Facing Deportation, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/nyregion/new-help-for-poor-
immigrants-who-are-in-custody-and-facing-deportation.html [http://perma.cc/28VZ-6WA4].  
201 See supra Figures 7 & 8 (reporting the percentage of cases in which immigrants seek 
counsel and success rates of finding counsel). 
202 See infra notes 205 (detained adjudication times) and 206 (nondetained adjudication times). 
For additional details on our methodology for measuring case duration, see infra Appendix, Part C. 
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Figure 17: Total Case Duration in Removal Cases, by  
Representation and Custody Status, 2007–2012 
 
Note: “Total Case Duration” includes median (hollow symbol) and average (solid symbol) 
number of days from first hearing until last hearing. Confidence intervals for mean days too 
narrow to present. 
 
Before proceeding, it is important to assess how much longer represented 
cases take than unrepresented cases. In the detained context, as seen in Figure 
17, the average total case duration for those with representation was 146 days 
(SD = 297), compared to only 23 days (SD = 141) for pro se respondents.203 
Nondetained cases took longer overall due to court backlogs and the low 
priority204 given to these cases in immigration courts.205 But, even for the 
nondetained (including both released and never detained), represented cases 
 
203 Median total case duration for detained cases was 64 days for represented respondents 
and 1 day for pro se respondents. See supra Figure 17. We also tested limiting the measurement of 
case duration to the merits proceeding and found detained cases were still longer with counsel, 95 
days (SD = 164) on average, compared to 14 days (SD = 75) for pro se respondents.  Median 
duration for the merits proceeding was 122 days for represented respondents, compared to 106 
days for pro se respondents. 
204 See Hearing on Improving Efficiency and Ensuring Justice in the Immigration Court System 
Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Juan P. Osuna, Director, 
Executive Office for Immigration Review) (“The highest priority cases for EOIR are those 
involving detained aliens.”). 
205 In our Case Duration Sample, the average total case duration of detained cases was 44  
days (SD = 184), compared to 545 days (SD = 562) for released cases and 493 days (SD = 607) for 
never-detained cases.  
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took longer on average: 667 days (SD = 621) for represented, compared to 183 
days (SD = 383) for pro se respondents.206  
Our analysis reveals that a number of factors are associated with these 
longer case times. These longer case times can be partially attributed to 
delays in attorney entrance into the cases. By analyzing when an attorney first 
appeared in court, we find that an average of 35 days (SD = 90) passed before 
an attorney appeared in a detained case. For nondetained cases, an average of 
104 days (SD = 234) passed before an attorney appeared in court.207 These 
delays in the attorneys’ entrance into the cases therefore account for some of 
the time differences between pro se and represented cases.208 By contrast, in a 
system of universal representation, attorneys could be appointed at or before 
the initial court appearance. Presumably, with earlier attorney involvement in 
an appointed system, the average length of cases would shrink. 
Another factor that contributes to longer case times on average for 
represented cases is that claims for relief are highly concentrated in those 
few cases that have representation.209 That 86% of cases with claims for 
relief had representation means that these cases require time to 
accommodate preparation of the application and to schedule the trial with 
the court. By contrast, pro se cases decided during the six-year period of our 
study had a median duration of only 1 day. If these cases were handled by 
attorneys, some claims would be found, but overall the average time for 
represented cases would undoubtedly decrease. 
 
206 Median total case duration for nondetained respondents was 497 days for represented 
respondents and 1 day for pro se respondents. We also tested limiting the measurement of case 
duration to the merits proceeding and found nondetained cases were still longer with counsel, with 
an average of 95 days (SD = 164) for represented respondents, compared to 14 days (SD = 75) for 
pro se respondents. Median duration for the merits proceeding was 50 days for represented 
respondents, compared to 1 day for pro se respondents.  
207 Medians are informative here too: the median nondetained respondent had an attorney 
appear two weeks after the case began, while the median detained respondent had an attorney 
appear at the first hearing. 
208 In order to determine how long it took for a represented respondent to obtain 
representation, we analyzed hearing-level data across the entire case. Specifically, we measured the 
number of days between the first hearing in the case and the date of the first hearing where an 
attorney was present. We found this measurement to be more reliable than an alternative method 
of using the number of days until the EOIR-28 was filed because on average attorneys appeared in 
court before the EOIR-28 filing date. On average, attorneys in detained cases appeared in court 7 
days before the EOIR-28 filing date, and attorneys in nondetained cases appeared in court 123 
days before the EOIR-28 filing date. This makes sense, as the EOIR database can only 
accommodate one filing date for a case, and in practice there are multiple reasons why more than 
one form will be filed in a single case, including for respondents who obtained more than one 
attorney, see supra Figure 5, for attorneys who changed firms, and for cases that changed venue.  
209 See supra Figure 15 (comparing pro se and represented rates of applying for  
relief from removal). 
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Table 6: Efficiency Measurements in Detained Cases with Applications for 
Relief from Removal, Based on Total Case Duration, 2007–2012 
 Pro Se Counsel
Measure Median Mean SD Median Mean SD 
Case Time 
(Days) 
133 255 453 166 314 456 
Case Time 
(Days) Until 
Att’y Appears 
— — — 21 46 90 
Applications       
Relief 1 1.69 1.19 1 1.50 1.13 
Voluntary  
Departure  
0 0.14 0.35 0 0.10 0.3 
Hearings  6 7.12 4.02 7 7.65 4.56 
Respondent 
Continuances 
to Prepare 
0 0.50 1.10 1 1.14 1.57 
Proportion Cases 
Granted Relief 
— .23 — — .47 — 
Note: Among detained respondents who applied for relief from removal (case time, applica-
tions, and relief grant, Pro Se n = 18,275, Counsel n = 34,860; continuances and hearings, Pro 
Se n = 17,184, Counsel n = 32,617). All mean differences are statistically significant at p < .001, 
two-tailed difference of means t-test; differences in relief grants rates are also significant at p < 
.001, two-tailed difference of proportions test. 
 
Table 6 addresses these issues more systematically by narrowing the 
comparison of total case duration to only one category of cases: detained cases 
with relief applications. For this category of cases, total case duration for pro se 
litigants was on average 59 days faster than for those with counsel. However, as 
the other data in Table 6 underscore, there is more to court efficiency than 
total days between the first and last court hearing in individual cases.210 Most 
 
210 Studies of other court systems have found that judicial involvement with represented 
cases may be less overall, thus counterbalancing inefficiencies associated with long adjudication 
times. See, e.g., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance, supra note 163, at 933-34 (determining that, 
although represented cases took a longer average number of days to complete, they did not 
increase the burden on the court because the extended time was offset by lawyers who 
“investigated facts and negotiated settlements,” leading to settlement without the court’s 
involvement); Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New 
York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 419, 429 
(2001) (finding that, despite the fact that the mean days for represented cases to final judgment 
compared to unrepresented cases was 131 versus 82 days, “the presence of an attorney at the 
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importantly, as the second row of Table 6 reveals, on average attorneys took 46 
days to appear in court. This alone accounts for the majority of the difference 
in overall case length between pro se and represented cases.  
Another relevant difference is that pro se detained cases seeking relief 
filed more applications with the court. As seen in Table 6, pro se detained 
respondents that sought relief, when compared to their represented 
counterparts, filed slightly more applications for relief on average (1.69 versus 
1.50) and more applications for voluntary departure than cases with attorneys 
that sought relief (0.14 versus 0.10). More applications by pro se relief seekers, 
which could be due to uncertainty as to what type of relief to pursue in the 
absence of a legal advisor, necessarily increase court workload.211  
Detained cases without counsel also filed more unsuccessful claims with 
the court: while 47% of cases with representation were successful, only 23% 
of cases without counsel obtained relief. This could signal that pro se 
respondents were unprepared to present their claims. Or, it could reflect 
that pro se respondents tended to present less meritorious claims—the kind 
which an appointed lawyer could have advised them not to pursue, and 
instead convinced them to agree to removal or seek only voluntary 
departure. Finally, detained cases with counsel had more continuances to 
prepare for trial: just over one on average, compared to only one-half in pro 
se cases (and a median of one for those with counsel versus zero for pro 
se).212 Continuances to prepare necessarily ease the burden on courts by 
allowing the respondent to be better prepared to address complex issues 
that may arise at trial. 
Our analysis of nondetained removal cases with relief applications 
yielded similar results, which are displayed in Table 7. While represented 
nondetained cases were on average longer than similar pro se cases (836 
versus 701 days), there was an average delay of 93 days before an attorney 
appeared in court. There was no statistically significant difference in the 
number of relief applications (represented filed an average of 1.81 versus 
1.79 in pro se cases), but pro se applicants were more likely to seek 
voluntary departure (0.13 for represented versus 0.17 for pro se). Pro se 
respondents also had slightly more hearings during the life of their case 
(6.83 for represented versus 6.98 for pro se), and were less likely to achieve 
relief (62% for represented versus 34% for pro se). 
 
tenant’s side may actually enhance [court] efficiency by reducing the number of motions, 
particularly post-judgment motions”). 
211 Note that median applications for relief and voluntary departure are the same. 
212 Across our entire National Sample, 41% of represented cases included at least one 
continuance for time to prepare during the case’s total duration, compared to only 5% of pro se cases. 
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Table 7: Efficiency Measurements in Nondetained Cases with Applications for 
Relief from Removal, Based on Total Case Duration, 2007–2012213 
 Pro Se Counsel
Measure Median Mean SD Median Mean SD 
Case Time 
(Days) 
544 701 609 649 836 660 
Case Time 
(Days) Until 
Att’y Appears 
— — — 0 93 231 
Applications       
Relief 2 1.79NS 1.26 2 1.81 1.29 
Voluntary 
Departure  
0 0.17 0.38 0 0.13 0.34 
Hearings  6 6.98 4.7 6 6.83 4.37 
Respondent 
Continuances 
to Prepare 
0 0.54 1.08 0 0.59 1.02 
Proportion Cases 
Granted Relief 
— .34 — — .62 — 
Note: Among nondetained immigrants who applied for relief from removal and who were not 
ordered removed in absentia (case time, applications, and relief grant Pro Se n = 10,763, 
Counsel n = 261,582; continuances and hearings Pro Se n = 10,381, Counsel n = 256,283). 
Superscript NS means the average difference was not statistically significant. All other average 
differences significant at p < .001, two-tailed difference of means t-test; differences in relief 
grant rates are also significant at p < .001, two-tailed difference of proportions test. 
 
Another factor influencing case length is regional variation. Figure 18 
contains average case adjudication times for detained cases with relief 
applications in the base cities with the highest volumes of detained 
immigration cases.214 This figure displays the disparity in case adjudication 
times across different jurisdictions. For example, in Lumpkin, Georgia, total 
case duration for detained cases with claims was an average of 101 days 
longer for represented cases than for pro se cases. In contrast, pro se cases 
with claims were not significantly shorter than represented cases in: 
Oakdale, Louisiana; Houston, Texas; and Miami, Florida.215 Furthermore, 
 
213 Cases that ended in removal in absentia were omitted from the analysis presented in 
Table 7. For additional discussion of in absentia removal orders in immigration court, see infra 
notes 232–33 and accompanying text. 
214 See supra Figure 10a. 
215 The differences in total case duration by representation status for these detained removal 
cases seeking relief in Miami (n = 4994), Houston (n = 2521), and Oakdale (n = 978) are not 
 
  
68 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 1 
 
unrepresented cases in some jurisdictions (such as Eloy, Arizona and 
Adelanto, California) took far longer than represented cases in others (such 
as El Paso, Texas and Miami, Florida). These data help to underscore that 
much of what drives the amount of time it takes for cases to reach a decision 
is based on local practice and docket pressures, rather than something 
inherent in lawyer involvement in the cases. 
 
Figure 18: Mean Total Case Duration in Detained Removal Cases Seeking 
Relief, by High-Volume Base City and Representation Status, 2007–2012 
 
Note: “Total Case Duration” is the average number of days from first hearing until last hearing 
for cases within each city for pro se (hollow dot) and represented (solid dot) respondents. 
Horizontal bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
This subsection has shown that a significant portion of case duration in 
both detained and nondetained cases is consumed with a search for counsel. 
Although represented cases on average take longer than pro se cases to 
conclude, when cases with claims are analyzed separately, represented cases 
reveal certain efficiency gains, including fewer hearings and more successful 
claims. As we demonstrate in the rest of this Section, other aspects of 
efficiency include whether individuals eligible for release are unnecessarily 
 
statistically significant (two-tailed difference of means t-test). Differences are significant for 
Lumpkin (n = 485), Eloy (n = 3123), El Paso (n = 2054) (p < .001), Adelanto (n = 2599) (p < .01), 
and Tacoma (n = 2095) (p < .05). 
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held in detention or fail to appear at future court appearances. On both of 
these measurements, we find that represented cases are more efficient. 
3. Release from Detention 
The third aspect of our efficiency analysis considers the role attorneys 
play in helping their clients seek release from detention. The high cost of 
detention makes these cases the most costly for the federal government to 
handle.216 To the extent that attorney involvement can facilitate the release 
of clients that should not be subject to detention, having counsel is 
associated with efficiency gains in removal adjudication. 
Early in the detention process, some immigrants are released by 
immigration officers at the detention center.217 Those who remain detained 
may ask the immigration judge for a custody redetermination,218 provided 
they are statutorily eligible.219 Immigrants who are granted bond will be 
released if they are financially able to post the required amount.220 If a 
detained immigrant is released, the government no longer incurs detention 
 
216 See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
217 See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (2015) (permitting immigration officers to release detainees if the 
alien does not pose a threat to property or persons and is likely to appear at court proceedings). 
218 See id. § 1003.19(a) (requiring custody and bond determinations to be considered by an 
immigration judge); id. § 1236.1(d) (allowing immigrants in custody to seek reconsideration of and to 
appeal a bail decision). In a pathbreaking recent decision, the District Court for the District of Columbia 
granted a preliminary injunction to bar detention officers from denying eligibility for bond based on 
consideration of “mass migration.” R.I.L-R v. Johnson, No. 15-11 (JEB) (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2015). 
219 Some immigrants are subject to mandatory detention. See I.N.A. § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c) (2012) (requiring the detention of certain classes of aliens). Courts have, however, begun 
to recognize due process limitations on mandatory detention. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 
F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that immigrants held beyond six months must be given 
individualized bond hearings to justify continued detention). For an argument that immigrants 
subject to mandatory detention ought to nonetheless be allowed to access supervised release 
programs, see Philip L. Torrey, Rethinking Immigration’s Mandatory Detention Regime: Politics, Profit, 
and the Meaning of “Custody”, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879 (2015). For a critique of the 
mandatory detention rules, see Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration 
Detention, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601 (2010). 
220 Many immigrants are not able to afford the high bonds set by immigration judges. Cf. 
I.N.A. § 236(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A) (2012) (setting the minimum bond amount at $1500 
when the immigrant is not granted conditional parole). In custody hearings we observed around the 
country, bond amounts set by judges ranged from $1500 on the low end to as high as $50,000. Other 
recent research has attempted to uncover the bond amounts set by immigration judges in practice. See 
ACLU, RESTORING DUE PROCESS: HOW BOND HEARINGS UNDER RODRIGUEZ V. ROBBINS HAVE 
HELPED END ARBITRARY IMMIGRATION DETENTION 4 fig.4a (Dec. 2014), https://www.aclu.org/ 
sites/default/files/assets/restoringdueprocess-aclusocal.pdf [http://perma.cc/KX37-R7QW] (finding 
that the average bond amount in a Central District of California federal suit challenging long-term 
detention was $15,883 and the median amount was approximately $10,000); REPRESENTATION IN 
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, supra note 14, at 20 (calculating the average bond amount set by San 
Francisco immigration court judges during the study period to be $5742). 
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costs; instead, the case is transferred to the nondetained docket and the 
immigrant can return to his or her community. In contrast, especially for 
immigrants who pursue claims for relief from detention, detention can be 
quite lengthy and therefore costly to the government.221  
 
Figure 19: Frequency of Custody Hearings and Release Among  
Immigrants Represented by Counsel, 2007–2012222 
 
Our data reveal that represented immigrants were more likely than those 
who went unrepresented to secure a custody hearing before the judge. 
Overall, as the left side of Figure 19 displays, represented detainees were 
almost seven times more likely than their pro se counterparts to be released 
from the detention center (48% versus 7%). As shown in the middle of Figure 
19, of individuals who were detained at some point during their case, 44% of 
represented detainees were granted a custody hearing before the judge, 
compared to only 18% of pro se detainees.223 This increase in custody hearings 
 
221 As we show in Table 6, supra, the mean total case duration for detained removal cases was 
255 days for those without counsel and 314 days for those with counsel. 
222 Figure 19 measures the frequency of adjourned “custody hearings,” also known as custody 
redetermination hearings, and “release,” which means actual release from the detention center. 
Both detained and formerly detained (i.e., released) respondents are included in Figure 19’s 
calculations. All differences between pro se and represented respondents were statistically 
significant (p < .001, two-tailed difference of proportions test). 
223 Because custody hearings may precede the first merits proceeding, we looked through the 
entire case history of proceedings completed on or before the merits completion to determine if a 
custody hearing was held.  
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may indicate that having an attorney is helpful in navigating the complex 
rules governing eligibility for custody hearings.224 In addition, once a custody 
hearing was held, represented litigants were more likely to be released from 
custody. Of those respondents with custody hearings, as seen on the far right 
of Figure 19, 44% of represented respondents were released, compared to only 
11% of pro se respondents.  
These findings are consistent with a recent empirical study by Emily 
Ryo showing that immigration judges were significantly more likely to grant 
bond to long-term detainees who had counsel, as compared to similarly 
situated detainees who appeared pro se at their custody hearing.225 Studies 
in the criminal court context have also found that defendants with 
representation at the bond hearing are more likely to secure release.226  
Importantly, this analysis of the relationship between release and 
representation is necessarily incomplete. For example, the fact that some 
immigrants are subject to mandatory detention under the immigration law 
limits the pool of individuals that can be granted custody hearings by 
immigration judges.227 In addition, respondents can be released by their 
detention officers without ever benefiting from having an attorney argue on 
their behalf at a custody hearing. Indeed, among those immigrants in our 
sample who were released, only 37% had a custody hearing before an 
immigration judge, demonstrating that their release was not based on a 
court order. Analysis of custody hearings is also unsatisfactory because 
immigrants may remain detained due to an inability to afford the bond 
 
224 Detention rules are notoriously complex. See, e.g., Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 944 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that “prolonged detention must be accompanied 
by appropriate procedural safeguards, including a hearing to establish whether releasing the alien 
would pose a danger to the community or a flight risk”); In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 806 
(B.I.A. 1999) (holding that a lawful permanent resident may show that mandatory detention does 
not apply because DHS is “substantially unlikely to establish . . . the charge or charges that would 
otherwise subject the [respondent] to mandatory detention”). 
225 See Ryo, supra note 182 (finding that pro se long-term detainees granted bond hearings were 
three-and-a-half times less likely to be granted bond than those who were represented by counsel). 
226 See Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for 
the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1755-56 (2002) (concluding that 
represented defendants in criminal cases were more likely than pro se defendants to be released on 
their own recognizance, to have their initial bail amount reduced, and to serve less jail time). 
227 See I.N.A. § 236(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012) (requiring the detention of certain 
classes of immigrants). But see Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding 
that immigrants held beyond six months must receive individualized bond hearings to justify 
continued detention). For a salient critique of the immigration system’s use of mandatory 
detention without providing counsel to immigrants, see Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional 
Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal 
Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63 (2012).  
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amount set.228 Thus, although a judge’s release order may reflect the judge’s 
assessment of flight risk and danger,229 successful release on bond also 
correlates with the immigrant’s financial status and family support.230 
Nonetheless, attorney representation could make a difference in these various 
contexts, including through informal advocacy to secure release from the 
detention officer and by assisting family members in gathering and posting 
the required bond amount. 
In conclusion, our analysis suggests that early involvement of attorneys 
in detained cases is associated with an increased likelihood of release from 
detention. Nearly half of represented immigrants were released from 
custody, compared to only 7% of pro se litigants. 
4. Failures to Appear in Court 
Immigrants who are not detained must appear in court at a later date for 
their immigration removal hearing. If, however, the respondent fails to 
appear for one or more of these hearings, the judge will be forced to enter a 
removal order without the immigrant being present.231 These removal 
orders issued when the immigrant fails to appear are referred to in practice 
as in absentia removal orders.232 
Addressing failures to appear in immigration court is a long-standing 
priority issue for immigration courts.233 The prevalence of in absentia 
orders has increased over time.234 Moreover, the Department of Justice has 
found that immigrants who fail to come to court and are ordered removed 
 
228 In our site visits, we observed that immigrants frequently requested bond reduction 
because their family could not afford the amount set by the detention officer. In many cases they 
did not obtain the requested reduction. 
229 See generally DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
CRIMES § 8:18 (2011 ed.) (discussing factors that the court must weigh in making bond determinations); 
Bonds/Custody, IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK, supra note 124, at 6-7 (same). 
230 See supra note 220 (discussing bond amounts in detained immigration courts). 
231 See I.N.A. § 240(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (2012) (requiring an alien to be 
removed if he or she does not attend a removal proceeding and the government establishes “by 
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that . . . written notice was . . . provided and that the 
alien is removable”). 
232 See, e.g., 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 74, at 7 (defining “In Absentia Order” as used  
in the Yearbook). 
233 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL 
YEARS 2005-2010 STRATEGIC PLAN 10 (Sept. 2004), http://cdn.preterhuman.net/texts/law/ 
US_DOJ/FinalTEREOIRStrategicPlan2005-2010September%202004.pdf [http://perma.cc/L264-
XNBS] (explaining that one of EOIR’s strategic goals is to study “failure-to-appear” rates). 
234 See, e.g., 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 74 at P3 & P3 fig.25 (reporting that in absentia orders 
for released respondents increased by 123% in the period between fiscal years 2009 and 2013).  
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in absentia are unlikely to be removed in the future.235 Consequently, in 
absentia orders reduce the immigration court’s ability to function as an 
adjudicative body that renders meaningful decisions. 
In an early study of failures to appear, the Vera Institute for Justice 
found that immigrants who participated in a community supervision 
program were more likely than those who lacked supervision to attend all of 
their immigration hearings and to comply with their final order.236 In a later 
study, Vera found that immigrants who were released from custody after 
participating in the Department of Justice’s know-your-rights program were 
7% less likely than those who did not participate in the program to be 
removed in absentia.237 Yet, as Vera researchers acknowledged at the time, 
representation by an attorney was “more strongly associated with reduced in 
absentia orders” than know-your-rights programming.238 
We analyzed the relationship between in absentia removal orders and 
representation in the nondetained court population.239 The results are 
remarkable. As seen on the left of Figure 20, 68% of pro se nondetained 
respondents were removed in absentia, compared to only 7% of nondetained 
cases with legal representation.240 Put differently, over the six-year period 
studied, only 32% of nondetained pro se respondents showed up to court, 
compared to 93% of nondetained respondents with counsel. 
 
 
235 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS DIV., U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, REP. NO. I-2003-004, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE’S 
REMOVAL OF ALIENS ISSUED FINAL ORDERS 13 (Feb. 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/ 
reports/INS/e0304/final.pdf [http://perma.cc/6PFF-SP6H] (“We examined the correlation between 
removals and court attendance and found that the aliens’ failure to appear before the Immigration 
Judge at removal proceedings is a significant and strong negative indicator for the likelihood of 
removal by the INS.”). 
236 See 1 EILEEN SULLIVAN ET AL., TESTING COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR THE 
INS: AN EVALUATION OF THE APPEARANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, at ii (2000), 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/INS_finalreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
TA6N-84VA] (finding that 91% of immigrants under supervision attended court hearings and that 
supervision almost doubled the rate of compliance with final orders).  
237 VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 57 fig.14. 
238 Id. at 56 n.68. 
239 For our coding methodology, see infra Appendix, Part A. 
240 This finding of a strong association between in absentia removals and pro se status is even 
more striking than that published in the Vera Institute’s 2008 study. See VERA EVALUATION, supra note 
16, at 59 (finding an in absentia rate for released unrepresented persons of 62%, compared to only 17% for 
represented persons). 
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Figure 20: Rates of In Absentia Removal Orders for Nondetained Removal 
Respondents, by Application Status, 2007–2012 
 
When we isolated only those respondents who were ordered removed by 
the judge, the difference was even more dramatic. As seen in the second set 
of bars in Figure 20, 90% of pro se respondents with removal orders were 
removed in absentia, versus only 29% of represented respondents with 
removal orders.241 Likewise, as the next two sets of bars in Figure 20 reveal, 
these differences in rates of in absentia removal between the represented 
and unrepresented persisted even when we accounted for whether a relief 
application was pursued. Pro se applicants for asylum or other types of 
relief, as compared to their represented counterparts, were ten times more 
likely to be removed in absentia.  
Together, these findings suggest that representation by counsel is 
strongly associated with immigrants coming to court and participating in 
their hearings. One reason why represented immigrants may be more likely 
 
241 New research by Emily Ryo finds that lack of compliance with immigration law by 
unauthorized migrants is connected to their belief that “current U.S. immigration policy is neither 
in alignment with their expressed moral values nor legitimate.” Emily Ryo, Less Enforcement, More 
Compliance: Rethinking Unauthorized Migration, 62 UCLA L. REV. 622, 629 (2015). See also Leisy J. 
Abrego, Legal Consciousness of Undocumented Latinos: Fear and Stigma as Barriers to Claims-Making 
for First- and 1.5-Generation Immigrants, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 337, 363-64 (2011) (finding that 
claimmaking by immigrants is limited by feelings of fear and social stigma). In the context of 
immigrant removal, the provision of universal counsel may go a long way toward increasing 
compliance with immigration law and claimmaking by immigrants, precisely because it would 
demystify and enhance the perceived legitimacy of the immigration court process.  
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to attend all of their hearings is because of the role counsel plays in guiding 
their clients and advising them of their hearings.242 This participation 
makes the immigration removal decisions of the nation’s immigration courts 
even more meaningful. 
In summary, involvement of counsel in immigration cases was associated 
with measurable gains in court efficiency. Represented respondents were 
less likely to use valuable court and detention time seeking counsel, and 
they were also more likely to be released from custody. Finally, once 
released, represented immigrants were more likely to appear at their 
subsequent removal hearings. Access to counsel can ease the burdens carried 
by both immigrants and courts. 
CONCLUSION 
Our goal in this Article is largely descriptive—to provide a data-driven 
context for future discussion of the pivotal issue of access to counsel in 
United States immigration courts. We reveal that during the time period of 
our study, 63% of all immigrants went to court without an attorney. 
Detained immigrants were even less likely to obtain counsel—86% attended 
their court hearings without an attorney. For immigrants held in remote 
detention centers, the ability to obtain counsel was even more severely 
impaired—only 10% of detained immigrants in small cities obtained counsel, 
yet more than 200,000 immigrants had their cases heard in these far-away 
detention centers. Furthermore, some cities with active immigration courts 
did not have a single practicing immigration attorney.  
The bottom line is that the cases of poor immigrants are left to legal 
services attorneys, law school clinical programs, and pro bono volunteers. 
Yet, during the six years of our study, we estimate that only 2% of 
immigrants in removal proceedings obtained counsel from these types of 
free representation programs. The volume of removal cases is simply too 
great for existing immigrant aid resources to cover. 
Parts I and II of this Article outlined the gross inequality of access to 
counsel across nationality, geography, and detention status. Our findings in 
Part III focused on questions of efficacy and efficiency of attorney 
involvement in immigration courts. By looking at court files in over 1.2 
million removal cases, we showed that attorneys were strongly associated 
 
242 As Sabrineh Ardalan argues in the context of asylum cases, pro se applicants struggle to 
navigate the court system, especially when hearings are scheduled with little warning and notices 
are sent to old addresses. See Ardalan, supra note 116, at 1017 (noting that “[t]hese types of 
bureaucratic failures have serious consequences in asylum cases, where a missed court date can lead 
the court to issue an in absentia removal order”). 
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with positive outcomes in the cases where they provided representation. 
Our regression analysis, which controlled for numerous case- and 
respondent-specific characteristics, reported this result most dramatically: 
the odds were fifteen times greater that immigrants with representation, as 
compared to those without, sought relief, and five-and-a-half times greater 
that they obtained relief. Other analyses presented in this Article also 
documented a strong relationship between representation by counsel and 
successful case outcomes. Tellingly, over a six-year period only 2% of 
immigrants without counsel prevailed in their cases. 
Our analysis in Part III introduced a sophisticated understanding of the 
relationship between attorney representation and court efficiencies. We 
identified three areas in which representation was associated with certain 
improvements in court adjudication goals. First, pro se litigants consume 
valuable court time with continuances to seek counsel. These continuances 
are particularly costly for detained litigants, who are unlikely to find 
counsel. Second, represented litigants are more likely to obtain a custody 
hearing and be released on bond. When immigrants are released from 
custody, expenditures on detention are eliminated. Finally, for released and 
never-detained respondents, representation is associated with considerably 
lower rates of failures to appear. When immigrants subject to removal do 
not come to court, immigration courts cannot do their job. 
The potential establishment of a public defender corps for the 
immigration system raises implementation questions similar to those faced 
by the criminal justice system in the pre-Gideon era. If attorneys were to be 
appointed for all immigrants facing removal, how might their appointment 
change the outcomes for immigrant respondents, the functioning of 
immigration courts, and the overall structure of the immigration removal 
system? Deciding whether and how to incorporate a system for appointed 
counsel representation necessarily requires a careful balancing of competing 
values of equality of access to counsel, efficacy of counsel in the 
immigration court context, and the efficiency of courts that incorporate 
appointed counsel. These issues should continue to be the subject of future 
research, including by closely studying pilot projects and pro bono 
initiatives that provide universal representation and by conducting 
experiments in which counsel is randomly assigned. 
Our findings provide an urgent national portrayal of the severity of 
barriers to accessing counsel in immigration courts. Moreover, we show that 
attorneys are associated with dramatically higher rates of success for 
respondents and certain improvements in court efficiency. At the national 
level, meaningfully expanding counsel for immigrants demands serious 
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thinking about the structure of immigration courts, which currently operate 
without lawyers in most cases. The empirical evidence presented in this 
Article provides an essential framework for these future discussions. 
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APPENDIX 
The immigration court data analyzed in this Article were originally 
collected by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), the 
Justice Department division responsible for administering the nation’s 
immigration court system. We obtained the data for analysis in this Article 
in our capacity as Fellows of the Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University.243 Researchers at TRAC 
obtained the data from EOIR by submitting requests pursuant to the 
Freedom of Information Act.244  
The complete EOIR database that we received includes 6,165,128 
individual immigration proceedings which span from fiscal years 1951 to 2013. 
Following the procedures discussed in this Appendix, these data were reduced 
to an analytical sample of 1,206,633 individual removal cases in which 
immigration judges reached a decision between fiscal years 2007 and 2012. 
Before beginning our analysis, we first reviewed the EOIR data for 
completeness and accuracy. We performed validity checks by comparing the 
data with the EOIR’s annual statistical reporting of the same data.245 We 
also reviewed other publications that analyzed EOIR immigration court 
data, including those by government researchers,246 nonprofit research 
organizations,247 and legal scholars.248 
The Immigration and Nationality Act,249 as well as expository texts and 
practice manuals,250 site visits to immigration courts,251 and interviews with 
practicing immigration attorneys252 provided the overall legal context for 
 
243 For more background on TRAC and its process for gathering public records, see About 
Us, TRANSACTIONAL REC. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/aboutTRACgeneral. 
html [http://perma.cc/FPP5-EDR6] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). 
244 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
245 Each year, EOIR publishes a lengthy statistical report. See, e.g., 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13. 
246 See, e.g., BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 27; INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra 
note 136; GAO ASYLUM REPORT, supra note 58. 
247 See, e.g., VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16; Kerwin, supra note 58 (note that this was 
written when the author was Executive Director of the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, 
Inc.); Asylum Disparities Persist, Regardless of Court Location and Nationality, TRANSACTIONAL 
REC. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Sept. 24, 2007), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/183 
[http://perma.cc/MW27-862T]. 
248 See, e.g., Linda Camp Keith et al., Explaining the Divergence in Asylum Grant Rates Among 
Immigration Judges: An Attitudinal and Cognitive Approach, 35 LAW & POL’Y 261 (2013); Ramji-
Nogales et al., supra note 15. 
249 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq). 
250 See, e.g., KESSELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 229. 
251 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
252 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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the patterns observed in the data. In analyzing the coding used in the EOIR 
database, we also relied on other interpretative materials obtained from 
EOIR through FOIA requests. These include EOIR’s data coding lookup 
tables,253 data management training manuals,254 court operating policies and 
procedures,255 and judicial training materials.256 
A. Coding of Case, Hearing, and Respondent Characteristics 
In conducting the analysis presented in this Article, we first coded the 
EOIR data for a number of case, hearing, and respondent characteristics.  
Representation by Counsel. Respondents with a Notice of Entry of 
Appearance form (known as an “EOIR-28”) filed with the court prior to the 
completion of the merits proceeding were treated as represented by counsel. 
If the EOIR-28 was filed on the same day as the completion of the merits 
proceeding, we counted the respondent as represented. In addition, if an 
EOIR-28 form was filed after the completion of the merits proceeding, the 
respondent was counted as represented by counsel if an attorney appeared in 
at least one hearing within the relevant merits proceeding.257 For purposes of 
 
253 Through FOIA, TRAC obtained from EOIR twelve lookup files to facilitate the proper 
identification of the values in the data. 
254 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, CASE DATA ENTRY COURSE 
LESSON PLAN, VERSION 1.3 (July 16, 2010) (obtained by authors with FOIA Request #2013-15030); 
EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, CASE HELP DESK FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS (Dec. 23, 2010) (obtained by authors with FOIA Request #2014-7182); EXEC. OFFICE 
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, CASE TRAINING MANUAL, DRAFT VERSION 4.0 (Dec. 2003) 
(obtained by authors with FOIA Request #2013-15030); EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, 
UNIFORM DOCKETING SYSTEM MANUAL (Apr. 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
eoir/legacy/2014/04/07/DocketManual_12_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/ER3V-GNEX]; Adjournment 
Code Memo, supra note 126.  
255 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DIGITAL AUDIO RECORDING USER 
MANUAL, VERSION 3.3 (Oct. 24, 2012) (obtained by authors with FOIA Request #2014-7182); COURT 
PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 65; Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, 
Exec. Office for Immigration Review, to All Assistant Chief Immigration Judges et al. (Aug. 18, 2004), 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/oppm04/04-06.pdf [http://perma.cc/C6SF-H7CA]. 
256 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, CASE COURSE 
ADMINISTRATOR COURSE LESSON PLAN, VERSION 1.1 (July 2, 2010) (obtained by authors 
with FOIA Request #2013-15030); IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK, supra note 124, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/immigration-judge-benchbook [http://perma.cc/237D-398A]. 
257 We identified approximately 33,000 cases where an attorney appeared in court, but never 
filed an EOIR-28 form with the court. Consistent with the methodology used by both EOIR and 
the Vera Institute, we coded these cases as unrepresented. We did, however, analyze these cases 
and found that they have characteristics more consistent with having had no representation during 
the merits proceeding. Compared to represented respondents, they were significantly more likely 
to be detained, have no application for relief, and lack an individual hearing (p < .001, two-tailed 
differences of proportions test). In addition, their total case duration was significantly shorter  
(p < .001, two-tailed differences of means t-test).  
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measuring whether the attorney appeared, we relied on the EOIR attorney 
identification code entry at the hearing level (eoirattorneyid field).258 
Out of our total sample of 1,206,633 removal cases, 465,018 cases had 
EOIR-28 forms on file, of which 35,119 forms were filed after the conclusion 
of the merits proceeding. Of these cases, however, approximately half (n = 
17,253) had an attorney appear in at least one hearing during the merits 
proceeding.259 Therefore, we counted these cases as represented.260 The 
remaining 17,866 cases with late-filed EOIR-28 forms261 had no attorney 
recorded as present at any merits hearing and were counted as 
unrepresented.262  
Detention Status. The EOIR data classify each case with one of three 
case-level codes for custody status. A detained respondent is coded as “D.” 
Respondents who are initially detained but later released—on bond or some 
alternative type of condition—are coded as “R.” If EOIR has no record of 
the respondent ever having been detained, the code “N” is used.  
Hearing-Level Coding. We included hearing-level characteristics when 
analyzing our final sample of 1,206,633 removal cases. EOIR maintains a 
database for every hearing scheduled in a given case, including the hearing 
type (e.g., “Initial Master” or “Custody”), the adjournment date, and the 
adjournment reason (e.g., “Alien to Seek Representation”). These hearing 
data also include a unique EOIR attorney identification code that identifies 
the attorney that was present at the hearing.  
We summarized hearing-level characteristics for each case. Hearings not 
likely to have taken place were removed from all calculations. For example, 
if the first hearing of a case was adjourned due to unplanned leave by  
 
258 Some research has relied on EOIR’s alien_atty_code field to determine representation. 
We rely on the eoirattorneyid field, however, because it is a more specific identifier, is more 
commonly used to identify attorneys at the hearing level, and allows us to connect hearing-level 
data to attorney characteristics. In our data, only a small number of cases (n = 123) were populated 
by the alien_atty_code field but not the EOIR attorney identification code. In those cases, we 
counted the immigrant as pro se. 
259 In order to assess whether the immigrant was represented in any hearing in the merits 
proceeding, we relied on the EOIR attorney identification information entered at the hearing level.  
260 Under EOIR’s accounting system, all of these cases would be counted as represented. 
Under the Vera Institute’s accounting system, all of these cases would be counted as pro se. 
261 A small number of these cases with a late-filed EOIR-28 form (n = 478) lacked any 
hearing-level data (i.e., we could not confirm attorney presence). The rest had hearing-level data 
but none included any record documenting that an attorney came to court. 
262 Before classifying these 17,866 cases as pro se, we conducted additional analysis and 
confirmed that they had characteristics consistent with no representation during the merits 
proceeding. Compared to late filers with an attorney present, they were significantly more likely to 
be detained, have no application for relief, and lack an individual hearing (p < .001, two-tailed 
differences of proportions test), and their total case duration was significantly shorter (p < .001, 
two-tailed differences of means t-test).  
  
2015] A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court 81 
 
an immigration judge, that hearing would not count towards the total 
number hearings.  
Attorney Type. EOIR maintains a database of attorney-level 
characteristics for each attorney who appears in immigration court. These 
characteristics include attorney name, firm name, and firm address, as well 
as the same unique EOIR attorney identification code as included in the 
hearing-level data. 
To characterize the type of attorney representing each respondent, we 
coded each attorney as being involved in one of several organizational types, 
based on the attorney name, firm name, and firm address.263 We were able to 
associate 87% of represented cases (n = 447,152) with one or more specific 
attorneys. For those cases in which no attorney appeared at any hearing (n = 
49,924), we were unable to determine attorney type and these cases were 
excluded from the analysis. In addition, we excluded the small number of cases 
for which we were missing hearing-level data (n = 3813) or lacked reliable 
attorney information because of administrative errors in the data (n = 4884).  
The following organizational types were used: Nonprofit (including 
religious organizations); Law School Clinic; Public Defender; Large Firm 
(more than 100 attorneys); Medium Firm (from 11 to 100 attorneys); Small 
Firm (10 or fewer attorneys)264; Government (not including public 
defender); and In-House Counsel. In making these categorizations, we 
researched attorney names and associated organizations in web searches, as 
well as through databases maintained by state bar associations and the 
membership list of the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA). 
To further ensure reliability, we then conducted random checks on this 
coding as well as general analysis of coding patterns.265  
Attorneys per Base City. Our analytical sample of removal cases contained 
48,305 unique attorney identification numbers. In order to calculate the 
number of attorneys that appeared in immigration courts by base city, we 
took into account that some attorneys had more than one attorney 
 
263 For this analysis, we relied on the EOIR attorney identification codes and corresponding 
data on those attorneys. For attorney entries without a firm name, we identified organizational 
type by matching entries with the same address that had already been categorized.  
264 In categorizing attorneys as belonging to small firms, the following were included:  
(1) entries with an organizational name that matched the attorney name; (2) entries that contained 
the phrase “Law Office of” or “Law Offices of”; and (3) entries with an organizational name that 
lacked any web presence. 
265 For example, we ensured that attorneys with the same name at the same address had the 
same firm type.  
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identification number.266 Where the identification numbers varied, we used 
attorney name and address to ensure that we counted unique attorneys.267  
Base City. During the six-year period that we analyzed, the EOIR 
database contains fifty-five different court jurisdictions, known as “base 
cities.” We used hearing-level data to determine the jurisdiction for a case, 
because the hearing-level data included more recent base city designations 
than the proceeding-level data provided by EOIR.268 Using the hearing-
level data, we coded each respondent’s case as occurring in the base city in 
which the judge’s decision on the merits was rendered. For those cases that 
lacked coding of the base city at the hearing level, we relied instead on base 
city associated with the case in the EOIR master record.  
Base City Size. We coded each immigration court jurisdiction included in 
our study based on the size of the city in which the court is located.269 In 
determining city size, we relied on 2010 population data collected by the 
United States Census Bureau to create three categories for city size.270 
Small Cities are those cities with populations up to 50,000.271 Medium 
 
266 For example, some attorneys had a different identification number in each base city where 
that attorney practiced.  
267 The data presented in Table 2 rely on this coding method to ensure we counted only 
unique attorneys, rather than unique identification codes.  
268 For example, Adelanto, California was not listed in the proceeding-level master record data file.  
269 In order to identify the location of the immigration court, we relied on the EOIR 
Immigration Court Listing, supra note 45. 
270 See American Factfinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/ 
jsf/pages/index.xhtml [http://perma.cc/NP9K-P2NL] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015); 2010 Census Island 
Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/2010census/news/press-kits/island-areas/ 
island-areas.html [http://perma.cc/Z3AU-ZYPR] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). For San Pedro, 
California, 2010 data were not available, so we relied on 2000 Census data instead. San Pedro, L.A. 
TIMES, http://maps.latimes.com/neighborhoods/neighborhood/san-pedro/ [http://perma.cc/RZ6W-
UHZ5] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). For Honolulu, we obtained the 2010 population from data 
collected by the United Nations. City Population By Sex, City and City Type, UNDATA, 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=POP&f=tableCode%3A240 [http://perma.cc/9QHF-5P2G] (last 
updated Dec. 22, 2014).  
271 Our Small City category combines the United States Census Bureau’s definitions of 
“urban cluster,” which is an area with a population of 2500 or greater but less than 50,000, and 
“rural place,” which is an area with a population less than 2500. Urban and Rural Classification, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/urban-rural.html [http://perma.cc/ 
9P4Q-3HY7] (last updated July 27, 2015). Using this method, the following base cities were 
classified as Small Cities: Bradenton, Fla. (population 49,546); Eloy, Ariz. (population 16,631); 
Florence, Ariz. (population 25,536); Hagatna, Guam (population 1051); Imperial, Cal. (population 
14,758); Los Fresnos, Tex. (population 5542); Lumpkin, Ga. (population 2741); Napanoch, N.Y. 
(population 1174); Oakdale, La. (population 7780); Saipan, N. Mar. I. (population 48,220); and 
York, Pa. (population 43,718). 
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Cities are those with a population larger than 50,000, but less than 
600,000.272 Large Cities are those with population of 600,000 or more.273  
Nationality. We coded each case based on respondent nationality. We 
then assigned each case to one of six geographic regions: Mexico, Central 
America, South America, Caribbean, Asia, and Other.274 Individuals who 
were stateless or had no known nationality were excluded from regression 
and nationality analyses.  
Voluntary Departure. A noncitizen in removal proceedings may apply for 
permission to leave the United States “voluntarily” instead of by order of 
the immigration judge.275 Voluntary departure is often considered to be a 
benefit, as it allows the immigrant to avoid certain harsh consequences of a 
 
272 Our Medium City and Large City categories divide the United States Census Bureau’s 
definition of “Urbanized Area” (cities with populations of 50,000 or more) into two subsets. Id. Using 
this method, the following base cities were classified as Medium Cities: Adelanto, Cal. (population 
31,765); Arlington, Va. (population 207,627); Atlanta, Ga. (population 420,003); Bloomington, Minn. 
(population 82,893); Buffalo, N.Y. (population 261,310); Cleveland, Ohio (population 396,815); 
Elizabeth, N.J. (population 124,969); Guaynabo, P.R. (population 75,443); Harlingen, Tex. 
(population 64,849); Hartford, Conn. (population 124,775); Honolulu, Haw. (population 337,256); 
Kansas City, Mo. (population 459,787); Lancaster, Cal. (population 156,633); Las Vegas, Nev. 
(population 583,756); Miami, Fla. (population 399,457); New Orleans, La. (population 343,829); 
Newark, N.J. (population 277,140); Omaha, Neb. (population 408,958); Orlando, Fla. (population 
238,300); San Pedro, Cal. (population 80,065); Tacoma, Wash. (population 198,397); Tucson, Ariz. 
(population 520,116); and West Valley, Utah (population 129,480). 
273 Using this method, the following base cities were classified as Large Cities: Baltimore, Md. 
(population 620,961); Boston, Mass. (population 617,594); Charlotte, N.C. (population 731,424); 
Chicago, Ill. (population 2,695,598); Dallas, Tex. (population 1,197,816); Denver, Colo. (population 
600,158); Detroit, Mich. (population 713,777); El Paso, Tex. (population 649,121); Houston, Tex. 
(population 2,099,451); Los Angeles, Cal. (population 3,792,621); Memphis, Tenn. (population 
646,889); New York, N.Y. (population 8,175,133); Philadelphia, Pa. (population 1,526,006); Phoenix, 
Ariz. (population 1,445,632); Portland, Or. (population 583,776); San Antonio, Tex. (population 
1,327,407); San Diego, Cal. (population 1,307,402); San Francisco, Cal. (population 805,235); and 
Seattle, Wash. (population 608,660). 
274 Philip Schrag and his coauthors recently adopted a similar technique of relying on world 
regions to analyze EOIR data. See Philip G. Schrag et al., Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security’s 
Administration of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 651, 780, 792 (2010). In 
dividing the world’s countries into six regions, we began with the World Bank methodology of world 
regions. See Countries, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country [http://perma.cc/4P6R-
E5VC] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (categorizing each country into one of six categories: (1) Africa; (2) 
East Asia and Pacific; (3) Europe and Central Asia; (4) Latin America and the Caribbean; (5) Middle 
East and North Africa; and (6) South Asia). We then made several modifications to fit our data. The 
World Bank’s region of “Latin America and the Caribbean” was separated into four regions, as the 
majority of removal respondents are from this region. Specifically, we divided this region into Mexico 
(n = 574,448), Central America (n = 260,971), South America (n = 67,205), and the Caribbean (n = 
85,908). Due to the limited number of respondents in the other regions, we condensed them into two 
categories: Asia (n = 96,914, including the World Bank’s categories of East Asia and Pacific, Central 
Asia, and South Asia); and Other (n = 119,963, including the World Bank’s categories of Europe, 
Africa, Middle East, and North Africa).  
275 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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judge-issued removal order, such as bars to lawful readmission. However, 
given that respondents granted voluntary departure must leave the country, 
this Article does not refer to voluntary departure as a form of relief. 
Instead, individuals granted voluntary departure are counted as having been 
ordered removed. This approach follows that adopted by EOIR, which 
defines voluntary departure as “a form of removal, not a type of relief.”276  
Applications for Relief. We consider an immigrant as having applied for 
relief if he or she submitted at least one affirmative application for relief. 
The major types of relief pursued by removal respondents during the  
six-year time period that we analyzed are: asylum;277 withholding under 
convention against torture;278 asylum withholding;279 cancellation of 
removal (lawful permanent residents);280 cancellation of removal 
(nonpermanent residents);281 adjustment of status;282 section 212(c) relief;283 
 
276 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at Q1. 
277 Asylum is a form of discretionary relief available to individuals who qualify as 
“refugee[s]” by demonstrating past “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” I.N.A. 
§ 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).  
278 Under the Department of Justice’s regulations implementing the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT), Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, noncitizens in removal 
proceedings must not be removed to a particular country if it is “more likely than not” that they 
will be tortured there. 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(b)(1) (2015). 
279 Section 241(b)(3) asylum withholding is a form of relief that must be granted for a 
noncitizen found to have a clear probability of persecution in his or her country of origin, based on 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. I.N.A. 
§ 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012). 
280 Section 240A(a) cancellation of removal is a form of relief from removal available to 
noncitizens facing removal on criminal grounds (other than based on an aggravated felony) who 
have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence for at least five years and resided 
continuously in the United States for seven years after lawful admission. I.N.A. § 240A(a), 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012). 
281 Section 240A(b) cancellation of removal is a form of relief from removal available to 
noncitizens without legal status who have been physically present in the United States for a 
continuous period of ten years and who have not been convicted of various offenses, including 
crimes of moral turpitude, drug offenses, or falsification of documents. I.N.A. § 240A(b)(1), 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2012). In order to qualify, the applicant must demonstrate exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship to a citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, or child. 
I.N.A. § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2012). 
282 Adjustment of status is a form of relief from removal available to noncitizens eligible for 
lawful permanent resident status based on a visa petition approved by the Attorney General. 
I.N.A. § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2012).  
283 Section 212(c) relief is a form of immigration relief abrogated by IIRIRA and presently 
available only to noncitizens who entered plea agreements prior to April 1, 1997. For those who 
still qualify, section 212(c) requires lawful permanent residence for at least seven years and no 
conviction for an aggravated felony, unless the plea agreement for the felony was made before 
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and section 212(h) waiver.284 Some respondents applied for more than one 
form of relief. If the respondent withdrew his or her relief application 
before the judge ruled on the merits of the application, we did not count the 
respondent as having sought relief.285  
Asylum Applicants. For purposes of analyzing patterns in asylum cases in 
Table 1 and Figure 20, we coded anyone who had at least one application for 
asylum,286 asylum withholding,287 or protection under the Convention 
Against Torture288 as having submitted an I-589 application.289 In addition, 
because these applications can be submitted together with other forms of 
relief requests, we coded the outcome as relief so long as the case outcome 
was a grant of relief to remain lawfully in the United States.290 
Prosecutorial Charge Type. Every removal case begins with the filing of a 
charging document that states the government’s legal basis for removal.291 
For our analysis, we divided the charges included in the EOIR database into 
four categories. Beginning with the most serious, these categories are:292  
 
November 29, 1990, or, if entered into after this date (but before April 1, 1997), the applicant has 
served a term of imprisonment of no more than five years. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994). 
284 Section 212(h) relief is a form of discretionary relief that allows the Attorney General to 
waive the application of certain grounds of inadmissibility, including crimes of moral turpitude, 
prostitution, commercial vice, possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana, and two or more 
convictions for which a total sentence of five years was imposed. I.N.A. § 212(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(h)(1) (2012). For additional discussion of section 212(h) waiver eligibility requirements, see 
KATHERINE BRADY, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., UPDATE ON I.N.A. § 212(h) DEFENSE 
STRATEGIES (2011), http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/update_on_ina_212_1.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/58J3-L5AE]. 
285 Approximately 5% of the National Sample (n = 59,793) had at least one withdrawn 
application. Of these individuals, however, 71% maintained some other form of application for 
relief (n = 42,322). 
286 For a definition of asylum, see supra note 277.  
287 For a definition of withholding of removal, see supra note 279.  
288 For a definition of protection under the Convention Against Torture, see supra note 278.  
289 A similar methodology of grouping asylum-related applications for analysis was followed 
by the Vera Institute. See VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 39 n.47 (“To avoid mislabeling, we 
are reporting on the entire application as opposed to claims relating only to asylum, withholding, 
or [Convention Against Torture].”). 
290 We note that the EOIR data code cases granted only asylum withholding or Convention 
Against Torture as removals, rather than grants of relief. We choose not to alter EOIR’s categorization of 
these cases. These forms of relief do not result in a permanent-resident status and continue only as long 
as the noncitizen demonstrates eligibility. STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 8:15 (2014 ed.).  
291 In our National Sample, prosecutors used 139 unique charges, although any given case 
may contain multiple charges leveled against the respondent. 
292 This categorization of prosecutorial charges builds on a similar classification approach 
developed by TRAC. See Charges Asserted in Deportation Proceedings in the Immigration Courts: FY 
2002-FY 2011, TRANSACTIONAL REC. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (2011), http://trac.syr.edu/ 
immigration/reports/260/include/detailchg.html [http://perma.cc/2L67-FJ5W] (listing charges 
alleged against detainees in immigration proceedings from 2002 through 2011). 
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(1) aggravated felony;293 (2) other criminal conduct;294 (3) reentry and entry 
without inspection;295 and (4) other civil immigration charge.296 For 
respondents with multiple charges, we assigned their case to the most 
serious charge type. This method of prioritizing the most serious charge for 
categorizing removal statistics follows the prioritization hierarchy adopted 
by the United States Department of Homeland Security.297 
Stipulated Removals. Stipulated removal orders are based on a written 
agreement between the immigrant and DHS rather than the judge’s 
independent analysis of the underlying facts.298 If the respondent is not 
represented by counsel, the court must hold a hearing to determine if the 
noncitizen’s stipulation to removal is “voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent.”299 Cases that result in removal under the program are marked 
as stipulated removals in the EOIR case identifier database. 
In Absentia Removals. Immigration judges have the authority to enter 
removal orders against respondents who fail to appear at their hearings.300 
To enter a removal order in absentia, the government must present “clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing evidence” that the respondent is removable.301 
 
293 The aggravated felony category includes all charges based on convictions classified as 
aggravated felonies under the federal immigration law. I.N.A. § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).  
294 All criminal conduct and convictions not included in the “aggravated felony” category are 
included in the “other criminal conduct” category. In addition, a total of 244 cases that included more 
severe terrorism or national security charges were included under the aggravated felony category. 
295 This category includes all individuals charged as illegally entering under the federal 
immigration law, I.N.A. § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012), or returning to the 
United States after a prior deportation, I.N.A. § 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A) (2012). 
296 All civil immigration charges not classified as “reentry and entry without inspection” are 
included under the “other civil immigration charge” category. Common charges in this category 
include presence in violation of the immigration law and lack of a valid immigration visa. See 
I.N.A. § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (2012) (present in violation of law); I.N.A. 
§ 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (2012) (lack of valid immigration visa). 
297 See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All ICE 
Employees (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QL44-ABZC] (categorizing noncitizens who pose a danger to national security or a 
risk to public safety, especially those convicted of crimes, repeat immigration violators, and recent 
border crossers as the first priority for removal); see also FY 2014 ICE Immigration Removals, U.S. 
DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics (click on “Methodology”) 
[http://perma.cc/J8VX-ZE7B] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (noting that “[t]o prioritize the removal of 
convicted criminal aliens,” ICE relies on the level of severity of the criminal conviction, with the most 
serious “Level 1” offenders being those convicted of “aggravated felonies”).  
298 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.  
299 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2015).  
300 Id. § 1003.26. 
301 Id. § 1003.26(c)(1). 
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The master record file in the EOIR database identifies those cases where 
removal was entered in absentia.302  
Institutional Hearing Program. The Institutional Hearing Program (IHP) 
adjudicates the cases of immigrants convicted of deportable offenses while 
they are serving their criminal sentence.303 Therefore, IHP cases are not 
adjudicated while the respondent is in civil immigration custody, but rather 
while the respondent is incarcerated in a federal, state, or county facility.304 
For purposes of analysis, IHP cases were identified with a separate data file 
containing the IHP designation. 
Juvenile Cases. The EOIR data included cases of children as well as adults.305 
We classified juvenile cases as those with a case identification entry indicating 
either juvenile, unaccompanied juvenile, or NACARA dependent.306 
B. National Sample 
Preparation of the data for analysis included several steps to create a  
six-year sample of removal cases decided by immigration courts  
(the “National Sample”). 
Proceeding Type. For all tables and figures except for Figure 1, the data 
were limited to removal proceedings. Removal proceedings were by far the 
most common type of immigration proceeding in the EOIR dataset.307 Of 
 
302 For our National Sample of 1,206,633 removal cases decided from 2007 to 2012, we were 
missing information on the in absentia field in only fifty-seven cases, fifty-five of which were 
removed. We were able to validate our in absentia findings with those published in EOIR’s 
Statistical Yearbook. 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at H1 fig.10. 
303 See supra note 100. 
304 See 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at P1 (describing the IHP as “a cooperative effort 
between EOIR; DHS; and various federal, state, and municipal corrections agencies”).  
305 For recent research on the increase in migrant children in immigration courts, see OLGA 
BYRNE & ELISE MILLER, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE FLOW OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN 
THROUGH THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: A RESOURCE FOR PRACTITIONERS, POLICY MAKERS, AND 
RESEARCHERS (Mar. 2012), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/the-flow-of-
unaccompanied-children-through-the-immigration-system.pdf [http://perma.cc/5VPS-WRXR]; New 
Data on Unaccompanied Children in Immigration Court, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS 
CLEARINGHOUSE (July 15, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/359 [http://perma.cc/ 
HX6W-G3XV]. 
306 The same method was adopted by the Vera Institute, in consultation with EOIR. See 
VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 79 (classifying juvenile cases with the following case 
identification codes: J; J1; UJ; ND; and U); see also Adjournment Code Memo, supra note 126 
(defining EOIR’s case identification codes). 
307 The following proceeding types are not considered removal proceedings by EOIR: 
credible fear; reasonable fear; claimed status; asylum only; rescission; continued detention review; 
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA); exclusion; deportation; and 
withholding. See 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at C1-C3 (itemizing the different categories of 
immigration proceedings). 
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the 6,165,128 proceedings in entire dataset, 1,839,628 nonremoval 
proceedings were deleted, leaving 4,325,500 removal proceedings. 
Merits Decisions. The data were next analyzed to isolate the proceeding in 
which the immigration judge reached a decision on the merits. We coded 
each case as resulting in one of four possible merits decisions: case 
termination; grant of relief; voluntary departure; and removal.308 Like 
EOIR, we treated voluntary departure as a form of removal, as it requires 
the respondent to leave the United States.309  
The first on-the-merits decision in each case was treated as the relevant 
judicial decision for analysis of case outcomes.310 To identify the relevant 
outcome of each case, a total of 1,264,594 nonmerits proceedings were 
deleted, leaving 3,060,906 proceedings. We subsequently chose only the 
earliest on-the-merits proceeding based on completion date; in the small 
number of cases in which multiple merits proceedings were completed on 
the same day, the proceeding with the earliest hearing date (or input date in 
the case no hearing date was available) was chosen. Ultimately, we identified 
2,929,504 cases for analysis, each with one relevant merits decision.311 
Most administrative adjournments of proceedings, such as to change 
venue or transfer a case, are not considered merits decisions by EOIR.312 A 
very small number of administrative case closures, such as a grant of 
temporary protected status, are classified by EOIR as on the merits.313 
These closures accounted for less than 1% of judicial merits decisions each 
 
308 See id. at D1 (“In rendering a decision, the immigration judge may order the alien 
removed from the United States, grant some form of relief, or terminate the proceedings . . . .”). 
Relief can only be granted if the respondent submitted some form of application, but in a small 
number of cases removal is ordered despite a successful application for relief. Of the cases in our 
National Sample, approximately 5% of respondents who had at least one application for relief 
granted were ordered removed (8300 removal orders out of 153,077 total application grants). 
Almost all of these cases occurred in the asylum withholding and Convention Against Torture 
context. See supra note 290. 
309 See supra note 98. 
310 This methodology is consistent with other studies of EOIR data. See, e.g., GAO ASYLUM 
REPORT, supra note 58, at 65 (explaining that “we limited our analysis data set to only those 
proceedings with records that included the first decision on the merits .  .  . made by an 
immigration judge”); VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 86 (“[W]e used the first decision 
issued by the immigration judge as the case outcome in this analysis.” (citation omitted)).  
311 A similar case-level approach for analyzing immigration adjudication was adopted by the 
Vera Institute of Justice in reviewing the Legal Orientation Program. See VERA EVALUATION, supra 
note 16, at 81 (distinguishing between proceeding-level and case-level analysis and concluding “it 
would be confusing to report on proceedings as opposed to what we defined as ‘cases’”). 
312 See, e.g., 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 74, at D3 (defining proceeding-level completions 
classified as “other” as “not decided on their merits”).  
313 See, e.g., id. at C4 fig.6 (displaying administrative closure, failure to prosecute, other 
administrative completion, and temporary protected status as “other completions”). 
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year.314 Because our interest in case outcomes focuses on the relationship 
between removal, relief, and attorney representation, we did not treat these 
administrative closures as merits decisions. Instead, we looked to the next 
proceeding to determine if the judge ordered termination, relief, voluntary 
departure, or removal. If the judge did, we treated that merits outcome as 
the relevant case outcome.  
Fiscal Year. The data were next limited to cases decided in the six-year 
period between fiscal years 2007 and 2012. The federal government’s fiscal 
year begins on October 1 and ends on September 30 of the following year.315 
For case-level categorization of fiscal year, the completion date of the 
judge’s first merits decision was used.  
Final National Sample. A total of 1,201,379 cases decided prior to 2007 (or 
after 2012) were deleted,316 leaving a final National Sample of 1,206,633 
removal cases decided on their merits between fiscal years 2007 and 2012. 
C. Additional Analytical Samples 
Some analyses presented in this Article required modifications to the 
National Sample. In this Section, we describe the steps taken to create those 
additional samples. 
Court Continuance Sample. Analyzing court continuances necessarily 
relied exclusively on hearing-level schedule type. Approximately 5% 
(n = 59,414) of cases in our National Sample did not have this hearing-level 
data for one or more of the proceedings completed on or before the merits 
proceeding. Such cases were excluded from the National Sample for these 
analyses, leaving 1,147,219 removal cases in the Court Continuance Sample. 
In Figures 7 and 8 we relied on this sample to analyze case time provided 
for continuances to seek counsel, which we measured as the total number of 
days from when the continuance was granted to the date when the next 
court hearing across the entire case was held. 
Regression Analysis Sample. For the regression analyses presented in 
Section III.A, we narrowed the National Sample to further increase 
consistency across cases. Specifically, we removed prisoner cases decided 
under the IHP317 and juvenile cases.318 A total of 28,128 IHP cases and 
 
314 Id. at C2 fig.5. 
315 See Fiscal Year, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/fiscal_ 
year.htm [http://perma.cc/955S-V82U] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). 
316 In reporting the number of cases removed based on each variable, we included in the total 
those deleted due to lack of data for that particular variable. 
317 See supra notes 303–04 and accompanying text. This decision to remove IHP cases from 
the analysis of removal proceedings is consistent with that adopted by the Vera Institute in 
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subsequently 34,074 juvenile cases were removed, leaving 1,144,431 adult 
cases decided in the regular immigration court program.  
We added controls for a number of respondent- and case-specific factors. 
Using the coding methods already described in this Appendix, we controlled 
for the following factors: (1) nationality; (2) prosecutorial charge type; and 
(3) geographic region. In addition, we included fixed effects for (1) fiscal 
year of decision; and (2) base city of decision. A total of 1589 cases were 
missing data for one or more of these predictors used in the regression 
analysis. After removing these cases, 1,142,842 removal cases remained in 
the Regression Analysis Sample. 
Case Duration Sample. For the analysis of case duration presented in Part 
III.B, we removed both prisoner cases under IHP as well as juvenile cases to 
increase consistency across cases. We then excluded 156,809 cases that 
resulted in stipulated removal orders, because these cases by definition do 
not involve multiple case hearings.319 A Case Duration Sample of 987,622 
cases remained. Figures 16-18 and Tables 6 and 7 are based on this sample. 
“Total Case Duration” was measured as the time from the first hearing 
in the first proceeding at the beginning of the immigrant’s case (generally 
the master calendar hearing) to the date of the last hearing in the 
proceeding in which the judge issued the first decision on the merits.320 In 
cases where no hearing date was available for one or more proceedings 
completed on or before the merits decision (n = 59,414), the input date of 
the earliest proceeding and the completion date of the merits proceeding 
were used to calculate total case duration.  
“Time Seeking Counsel” was measured as the total time between 
hearings granted a continuance to seek counsel and the subsequent hearing 
adjourned for another reason, starting from the first hearing of the first 
proceeding at the beginning of the immigrant’s case (generally the master 
calendar hearing) to the date of the last hearing in the proceeding in which 
the judge issued the first decision on the merits. Time Seeking Counsel was 
calculated among cases with at least one continuance granted to seek counsel. 
 
studying detained immigration adjudication. See VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 90 (“We 
removed cases identified as Institutional Hearing Program cases from our analysis.”). 
318 See supra notes 305–06 and accompanying text. Other researchers have made a similar 
decision to remove juvenile cases in analyzing outcomes across cases. See, e.g., VERA 
EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 79 (“We deleted all cases coded with juvenile case IDs.”).  
319 See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. 
320 See supra Figure 17. A similar methodology for measuring case processing time was adopted 
to study the Department of Justice’s Legal Orientation Program. VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, 
at 16 n.13, 48, 81-82. 
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“Percent of Total Case Duration Seeking Counsel” was measured as the 
proportion of Time Seeking Counsel to Total Case Duration among cases 
with at least one continuance granted to seek counsel. 
“Merits Proceeding Duration” was measured as the time from the first 
hearing in the merits proceeding (generally a master calendar hearing) to the 
date of the last hearing in the merits proceeding.321 In cases where no hearing 
date was available (n = 49,749), the input date and the completion date of the 
merits proceeding were used to calculate merits proceeding duration. 
 
 
321 See supra note 206. 
